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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis is an extension of recent research into the relationships between non-
homothetic preferences and patterns of trade.  The analysis focuses on the observed shift 
in consumption towards income-elastic services and, relative to agricultural goods, 
income-elastic manufactures associated with rising per capita incomes.  In turn, the 
conjecture that we should witness a shift in global production and consequently a shift in 
trade away from primaries towards manufactured goods as the global economy develops 
is explored.  This hypothesized change in the sectoral composition of global trade implies 
a change in individual country trade patterns.  Specifically, the notion that a country’s 
exports must respond to a changing global market may help to clarify one of the principle 
causes of the shift towards manufacturing production among most small, trading 
economies.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A key preoccupation of studies in development and growth is to identify the specific 
structural characteristics of growing economies as they move away from particularly low 
per capita incomes.  Such research is commonly dedicated to examining changes in the 
structure of production in developing countries, their price structure, income distribution, 
and the relative importance of foreign trade, among other important issues, at various 
stages of development.  A monumental product of such efforts is Kuznets’ (1973) finding 
that economic growth is typically accompanied by structural shift away from agricultural 
production towards manufacturing and, eventually, away from industry towards services.  
This stylized fact of development has in turn motivated many important studies related to 
the processes of urbanization and industrialization, income inequality, and government 
subsidization and trade policies. 
 Much less familiar in the development and trade literature are inquiries into how 
this uneven, or alternatively ‘unbalanced,’ common development path has affected the 
composition of global trade in general and country trade patterns in particular.  In the 
long view, the dominant pattern of global consumption, production and trade has 
undergone a quite noticeable change.  The extensive studies conducted by Chenery and 
Syrquin (1975) and Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986) have previously examined 
the varying conditions that have brought about this transformation, noting in particular a 
gradual shift in the composition of both production and exports in many developing 
countries that closely parallels Kuznets’ fact.  First, with regard to production, the 
traditional closed economy view posits the relative change in the contribution of each 
sector to total output as an account of Engel’s law, where aggregate consumption of 
agriculture rises less that proportionally with growth in per capita income.  For the small 
open economy, the share of agriculture in total exports is also observed to decline on 
average relative to trade in manufactured goods as per capita incomes grow.  However, 
since this shift in the supply of goods to the rest of the world must in turn influence the 
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structure of production, the opportunity to trade potentially invalidates the first view.  A 
decomposition of the sources of sectoral growth in output in Chenery and Syrquin (1986, 
Chapter 3) shows that when allowing for the influence of trade in production decisions 
domestic demand tends to account for less than half of the rise in the industrial share, a 
finding they concede “requires a substantial revision in the common view that 
industrialization is largely explained by Engel effects.” 
 The basis for their argument is that a shift away from specialization in primary 
products is determined entirely on the supply side by factors relating to accumulation of 
physical and human capital, economies of scale, and government policy.  As we shall see 
in an overview of theories of trade in Chapter 2, this emphasis on supply conditions is the 
standard approach taken in explaining the volume of trade in each sector.  Nevertheless, 
even outside of a country’s borders, a change in the supply of a commodity must be met 
with commensurate changes in demand.  To the extent that most countries have 
experienced a similar shift in their pattern of trade, therefore, it is still necessary to 
account for the apparent transformation of global demand. 
Drawing upon the views of Echevarria (1997; 2000) and Kongsamut, Rebelo and 
Xie (2001), the thrust of this change appears to be rising incomes, and in particular rising 
world incomes, shifting emphasis back again towards the role of Engel effects in 
changing consumption patterns.  At the international level, what this suggests is that 
changing global demand should be incorporated into models of dynamic comparative 
advantage when examining a country’s intertemporal trade pattern.  And since a 
country’s own pattern of production and growth can be attributed in part to changes in the 
opportunities for trade presented to it by the changing structure of international 
production and demand, an approach such as this promises a fuller understanding of 
observed paths of development. 
Trade has for some time been viewed as critical to the pace of development.  
Whereas production in a completely closed economy at the earliest stages of development 
is necessarily tied to supplying the nation’s subsistence food requirements, trade allows a 
country to produce a completely different mix of goods than is actually consumed.  
Opportunities for exchange offer the possibility for further division of labour and the 
emergence of different crafts and skills (Bauer, 1998).  Developing countries can 
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therefore diversify their economies and rapidly “industrialize,” moving from agrarian 
production and small enterprise to highly specialized production and trade.  In often 
many, however, such specialization and trade requires that the new industries can operate 
at a scale at which efficient production is possible.  Bos and Kuyvenhoven (1969) note 
that the existence of such economies of scale places additional emphasis on demand in 
neighbouring countries so that sufficient capacity utilization can be expected through 
voluminous exports.  The reliance of some countries upon traditional primary exports to 
their impoverished neighbours may in part account for the low levels of industrialization 
in certain regions. 
At the same time, however, there exists a large number of developing economies 
moving away from agricultural production and trade toward the export of manufactured 
goods.  The most prominent examples are in Asia, and some in Latin America and in the 
Middle East.  In terms of the increasing number of industries in East Asia competing with 
traditionally “Western” exports, there has been considerable debate on the role of 
changing comparative advantage.  Explanations for the rapid industrialization of these 
countries and competitiveness in technology intensive sectors emphasize the role of 
technology transfer (Edwards 1991), innovation (Romer 1986, 1990), and accumulation 
of human capital (Lucas 1988).  On the other hand, the increasing numbers of developing 
countries competing in labour-intensive manufactured goods, or the so-called low-wage 
producers, have lent support to the notion of a product cycle, where due to the 
standardization of production processes it becomes more profitable to transfer these 
operations to developing countries where the initially higher costs of initially smaller 
scale production (or transfer of skills) are offset by the lower wages (Carolan, 1998).  In 
the tradition of the “new trade theory” and economies of scale, the transfer of production 
to the south may take a long time for some commodity groups, and in other industries 
there may not be a shift in comparative advantage at all.  As Gomery and Baumol (2000) 
point out, in many of today’s industries economies of scale and large entry costs 
emphasize the decisive role of acquired advantages rather than natural ones in 
determining trade patterns.  Any position of production and trade once arrived at, 
“whether deliberately or by the purist accident of historical events, does not break down 
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overnight.  Market forces will preserve it because of the difficulty of new entry for new 
competitors in such an industry.” 
While these perspectives together bring a more coherent understanding of various 
influences on the volume and composition of trade in any particular country, they ignore 
relative demand conditions that vary between countries at different levels of per capita 
income.  Markusen (1986) and Hunter and Markusen (1988) have demonstrated in a 
static framework that a relative consumption bias toward different bundles of goods, 
when tied to differences in per capita incomes, has significant potential to account for the 
direction of trade between developed and developing countries.  These models are 
explored in detail in Chapter 2 following a discussion of the standard trade theory and a 
review of the literature covering unbalanced growth.  Over time, the evolution of a 
country’s trade pattern is fundamentally a product of catering to domestic and 
international demands given its own production possibilities.  Thus a proper 
characterization of the trajectory of the composition of global consumption and 
production is equally vital in interpreting patterns of trade and development. 
 This study is an extension of recent research into the relationships between non-
homothetic preferences and trade.  Drawing upon previous work in economic growth and 
sectoral composition by Echevarria (1997) and Kongsamut et al. (2001), the model 
adopted in Chapter 3 to explain the dynamic pattern global production is simple, but 
general and straightforward.  In contrast to some earlier studies, identical non-homothetic 
preferences are assumed in this analysis rather than tested, focusing the analysis instead 
on the implications of the implied global consumption and production dynamics on world 
trade patterns.  The model highlights the observed shift in consumption towards income-
elastic services and, relative to agricultural goods, income-elastic manufactures.  This 
thesis, in turn, explores the conjecture that, as the global economy develops, we should 
witness a shift in global production and consequently a shift in global trade away from 
primaries towards manufactured goods.  This hypothesized change in the sectoral 
composition of global trade implies a change in individual country trade patterns.  Thus 
this thesis also explores whether countries are moving, some more rapidly than others, in 
the direction of an eventual decline in the overall share of primary commodity trade as a 
general rule. 
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 Chapter 4 describes the main results of this research and discusses some of the 
proposed explanations for the observed trade patterns from the standpoint of the theories 
covered.  The available statistical series pertaining to global trade covers the 1970-1992 
period for approximately 140 countries, excluding petroleum exporters and the 
particularly ‘small’ countries.  The ensuing cross-country comparisons extend in various 
ways the Chenery and Syrquin’s (1975) analysis of world development and trade patterns 
for the 1950-1970 period, although the present study benefits from more extensive 
country coverage and more detailed data on resource endowments. 
By shifting the focus from domestic supply conditions to the composition of 
exports, however, this study explores whether the observed patterns of change can be 
traced to shifts in international production and demand.  Specifically, the notion that a 
country’s exports must respond to a changing global market may help to clarify one of 
the principle causes of the shift towards manufacturing production among most small, 
trading economies.  Since an open-economy view of development necessarily relates 
patterns of production to a country’s comparative advantage, the analysis focuses on the 
role of differences in relative resource endowments in altering the predicted timing of the 
shift.  This approach to explaining observed patterns is offered as an alternative to the 
view that untimely transitions towards industrialization are an indication of 
disequilibrium in the domestic market, a disequilibrium attributed to the failure of 
government development policy to promote the right industries or to achieve scale 
economies.  However, arriving at a satisfactory explanation of how production and trade 
in each country evolves with changing comparative advantage is an arduous task; in the 
model estimated in Chapter 4, the average correspondence between changing global 
demand patterns, levels of development and the composition of trade provides only weak 
support for the development paths each country will follow.  The potential for diverging 
equilibrium development patterns is briefly considered in the closing remarks of the final 
chapter. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF THEORIES IN GROWTH AND TRADE 
 
Much of trade theory and empirical analysis, particularly in the tradition of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, have generally assumed that the respective shares of income 
devoted to the consumption of each commodity are not only the same across countries 
but also invariant to differences in per capita income.  That is, it has been a conventional 
assumption in most trade literature that preferences are identical and homothetic.  Given 
that the prices of traded goods are everywhere the same when abstracting from transport 
costs and barriers to trade, the assumption of identical homothetic tastes suggests that 
every household can be expected to purchase the same relative quantities of each good, 
the precise amount of these purchases rising proportionally with household or per capita 
income. 
 This approach to standard theoretical investigations into the determinants of trade is 
legitimate for emphasizing the relationship between differences in the structure of 
production, which are evidenced to be quite prominent between countries at different 
stages of development, and cost-driven patterns of specialization, without any special 
attention to the demand side of the equation.  The resounding emphasis on relative supply 
conditions in much of the trade literature is rooted in Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
advantage, where it is stressed that persistent differences in labour productivity across 
industries or commodity groups allow one nation to produce certain goods cheaper, 
thereby selling these goods to the rest of the world at a higher price than would be earned 
without trade.  The modern Heckscher-Ohlin theory extends this approach by attempting 
to account for the sources of unequal labour productivity across countries, attributing 
comparative cost advantages to measurable differences in the country’s endowment of 
one or another internationally immobile factor of production, often defined as either 
physical or human capital, land, or other natural resources.  In the course of theoretical 
refinement and empirical tests of this model, however, many of the additional variables 
that Heckscher and Ohlin regarded as significant, such as demand conditions and 
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economies of scale, were dropped completely from the discussion (Blaug, 1992, pp. 186).  
One drawback of this one-sided approach is that there has typically been only weak 
empirical support for many of the theory’s predictions. 
 This is not to suggest that the assumption of identical homothetic tastes is entirely 
responsible for the model’s poor performance.  There are indeed many insurmountable 
difficulties, both theoretical and practical, encountered when working with the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model.  As an example of the first type, the model itself involves a 
variety of outcomes depending on one’s assumptions concerning the number of factors of 
production, the degree of factor mobility, identical production functions across countries, 
etc., and therefore it is not unreasonable to expect that so much attention has been 
devoted to finding support for even these basic tenets before considering alterations to the 
traditional demand assumptions.  Formidable challenges emerge in practice when 
aggregating trade data into a manageable number of commodity groups.  Nevertheless, a 
familiar conclusion in many empirical studies is that the volume of inter-industry trade 
predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is far greater than the trade actually observed.1   
Recently, however, Trefler (2000) discusses different approaches to salvaging the model 
with the inclusion of an “error term” that allows for differences in aggregate consumption, 
leading not only to a remarkable improvement in the performance of the model but in 
some cases dramatic reductions in ‘missing trade.’ The results are improved further once 
a component dealing with the consumption of non-tradable ouput is included.  Chul 
Chung (2000) explicitly links this consumption bias to non-homothetic preferences in a 
general equilibrium trade model and demonstrates that this modification to the standard 
assumption accounts for a large portion of the missing trade. 
  The above evidence in support of nonhomothetic demands, along with the 
observation that countries with similar per capita incomes exhibit similar demand patterns, 
is surely of importance to anyone interested in decomposing the determinants of trade 
implied by the Heckcher-Ohlin theory.  Beyond altered expectations concerning the 
factor content of trade at any given moment, however, there is the question of how the 
composition of trade should be affected in the long-run as world income grows.    To 
                                                 
1 See Trefler (1995) for empirical estimates of the ‘missing trade’ predicted by the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin-Vanek model. 
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explore this subject fully, the following sections tie together some of the prominent 
theories of economic growth and international trade. 
 
2.1  THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR UNBALANCED GROWTH 
In a study of industry productivity and growth in 14 OECD countries, Bernard and Jones 
(1996) note that the share of manufacturing in overall production is either constant or 
declining over the period 1970-90 for almost every country.  Agricultural output displays 
similar patterns, although the diminishing share of total production is somewhat more 
pronounced when compared to manufactures in those countries where the manufacturing 
share is in fact declining.  Services represent the only sector where a steady upward trend 
in value of total production is evident for most countries in the sample.  These trends are 
resoundingly similar to those discovered by Kuznets (1973), Chenery, Robinson and 
Syrquin (1986), and Chenery and Taylor (1968), the third of these studies involving a 
sample of 54 countries both over time (1950-63) and at different stages of development 
(although the manufactures share displays an upward trend for sufficiently low levels of 
income).  That is, there is evidence of similarities between production patterns in not only 
time-series data but in cross-sectional data ranking countries by levels of per capita 
income, establishing a link between development and the sectoral composition of output. 
A wide range of economic literature has been devoted to providing a theoretical 
basis for understanding the empirical regularities in the structure of production that are 
observed as an economy develops.  This section attempts to synthesize some of the more 
general theories in order to present a simple dynamic view of the sectoral composition of 
economic activity, expressed in terms of the three broad sector aggregates just outlined.  
In a closed-economy framework, the analysis focuses on the main features that describe, 
independent of country specific factors such as government policy or natural resource 
endowments, the changing structure of production in a growing economy.  Drawing upon 
some conventional models of trade, we proceed to examine various complications when 
extending the analysis to the context of the open economy. 
Baumol’s (1967) analysis lends itself to a partial explanation for this observed 
connection between development and the composition of output, addressing the perceived 
rise in the service sector relative to industry.  One reason that services are of consequence 
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in this analysis is that the share of traded commodities in national production may slacken 
off at higher incomes where services are characterized by a higher income elasticity of 
demand (Bhagwati, 1985).  Baumol’s model is one of unbalanced growth in which the 
economy is divided between a technologically “progressive” and a “non-progressive” 
sector, each characterized by relatively high or low productivity growth.  Baumol affirms 
that the distinction is not entirely arbitrary; the source of differentiation resides in the role 
of labour in the two activities, and hence the classification is based on the technological 
structure of production.  In the progressive sector, innovation and economies of scale 
contribute to a cumulative rise in output, while labour is simply an instrument in this 
process.  In the non-progressive sector, by contrast, labour is itself the end product, and 
while innovations certainly give rise to increases in the productivity of these services, the 
quality of output is intrinsically tied to the amount of labour embodied in it (pp. 415-17). 
In the single factor model, where labour is the only input in production, the 
progressive sector experiences a constant rate of growth in output in every period while 
output in the second non-progressive sector is constant over time.  Wages are assumed to 
be equal in every period for both sectors, and thus grow in accord with productivity 
growth in the progressive sector.  From these basic assumptions, he derives several 
properties of the growing economy.  We emphasize the third proposition, which states: In 
the unbalanced productivity model, if the ratio of outputs of the two sectors is held 
constant, more and more of the total labour force must be transferred to the non-
progressive sector and the amount of labour in the other sector will tend to approach 
zero.  With rising productivity in the progressive sector, a consumption bias towards the 
services of the non-progressive sector implies an increasing proportion of total labour is 
absorbed by this sector.  This result is explained by the fact that the progressive sector 
requires progressively less labour per unit of output, and therefore a non-decreasing, non-
productive sector must make up an increasing proportion of the labour force.  It follows 
that, given similar wages in both sectors, the relative cost of services must rise with per 
output.  
Drawing upon previous work of Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1982), Panagariya 
(1988) reports the finding that as per capita incomes rise in any country, so does the price 
of services in it.  The additional evidence that labour productivity in services relative to 
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that in commodities is lower in rich countries than in poor countries strongly supports the 
main argument suggested by Baumol, that in the case of sufficiently price inelastic or 
income elastic demand for services (the non-progressive sector) more and more of the 
total labour force must be transferred to the non-progressive sector, and the relative cost 
share of the non-progressive industry will rise without bound.  Further examination 
reveals that the quantitative share of services in national production remains more or less 
constant across countries regardless of per capita income.  Kravis, Heston, and Summers 
(1982) confirm this result, demonstrating that as incomes rise services tend to constitute 
an increasing proportion of the value of national output, but when measured in 
international prices, the positive correlation vanishes and the quantity of services 
produced appears to be relatively constant.  A similar examination of both cross-country 
and time series data in Echevarria (1997) and Baumol (2001) also suggests that share of 
services, in real terms, in total output has remained more or less constant with rising per 
capita income.  
While this perspective provides a theoretical framework in which to interpret the 
rising share of non-tradable output as aggregate income grows, what remains is a notable 
shift in the relative importance of traded goods in total output throughout the 
development process.  In particular, broadly classifying traded goods as either primary 
production or manufacturing, the relative share that primaries represent declines at higher 
levels of income.  In much of the development literature, the production of primaries is 
identified as another sector characterized by lower relative productivity growth.  In 
contrast to the case of non-trade output, however, international competition implies that 
the long run price of primaries in terms of manufactures is determined by average 
international differences in productivity growth, so that changes in domestic production 
and demand conditions alter only the relative volume of goods produced and traded.  In 
examining how relative resource endowments and changing preferences together 
influence determine the relative volumes of goods produced and traded, it is necessary to 
begin with a formal theory of trade.  We will consider suitable models of trade in section 
2.2.  For now we shall briefly discuss the relationship between wealth-varying 
preferences and allocation decisions in production that would hold in the absence of trade.    
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Linder (1961) first observed that the declining share of primaries in aggregate 
production and consumption can be attributed to its large “necessary” or “subsistence” 
component at low levels of income, leading countries with similar per capita incomes to 
produce and trade similar goods.  The existence of minimum consumption requirements 
for different goods implies that income elasticities of demand for each good will differ 
depending on the magnitude of their respective subsistence minimums.  Such wealth 
varying elasticities have been empirically estimated; Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) find 
economically significant differences in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
between rich and poor countries, and estimate substantially higher subsistence levels for 
food compared to non-food requirements (pp. 518-19).   Deviations from homothetic 
demand are also found to be significant in Hunter and Markusen (1988), and a 
particularly low income elasticity is estimated for the demand for food.2  The estimated 
wealth-varying expenditures reveal an average income-elasticity for food of considerably 
less than 0.45, while elasticities for other goods and services were generally greater than 
1 (with the exception of furniture, fuel, and education).  Leisure, transportation and 
communication, and medical expenditures are among the categories with the highest 
elasticities, with estimates of 1.4, 1.7, and 1.9 respectively. 
The relatively high income elasticities for these last commodity groups, which 
have a large service component relative to the other commodities, supports the conclusion 
that  the expenditure share on services generally rises with income.  The fact that the 
marginal propensity to consume is substantially lower for food compared to all other 
commodities is also significant; by separating commodity production into separate groups 
representing primaries and manufactures, one should expect considerable variation in 
patterns of consumption between the two groups as the economy develops.  As per capita 
incomes rise, an income-elasticity below 1 suggests that the share of primaries in GDP 
declines.3  In turn, the share of manufacturing in the value of total output may either rise 
or fall depending on the relative magnitude of the consumption bias towards services.  
                                                 
2 These results are derived from estimation of an aggregate linear expenditure system (LES) on 11 
commodity groups for a sample of 34 countries, each country’s expenditures measured in terms of its 
purchasing power parity estimates.   
3 Assuming similar rates of productivity growth in both traded goods sectors, and in turn a constant relative 
price, a declining relative share in the value of total production (GDP) is synonymous with slower growth 
in actual output.  In the case of lower productivity growth in the agricultural sector, the relative price of 
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 In summarizing these perspectives we arrive at a complete (closed-economy) 
description of the commonly observed development pattern.  As per capita income grows, 
the share of services in the value of total output rises while the share of primaries falls.  A 
higher average income elasticity of demand for the former raises the expenditure share, 
although much of this increase can be attributed to rising relative prices with little 
variation in the relative quantities consumed.  Finally, the manufacturing share tends to 
rise at early stages of development and then to decline gradually as the value of services 
begins to dominate in the later stages. 
When expanding the model to allow for trade, it is necessary to consider how each 
dimension of the unbalanced growth path is altered, including the growth, levels, and 
structure of production throughout the development of the small open economy.  So far 
we have examined how, in the absence of trade and international capital movements, 
shifts in the structure of production can be attributed to relative domestic demand for 
each commodity group at varying levels of per capita income.  Since international trade 
represents a highly significant proportion of economic activity in many countries, 
changes in relative global demand are equally important in an examination of production 
decisions.  If, for instance, there is a shift domestic demand without a proportional shift in 
world demand, the resulting excess demand could initiate a change in the composition of 
both exports and imports without any change in the structure of output.  Conversely, 
shifts in global demand may alter domestic production decisions irrespective of any 
change in the level of development at home.  The direction of such changes in the 
composition of production or trade clearly depends on a country’s particular levels of 
production and desired consumption at any given moment in time.  The following 
sections draw upon the familiar notion of comparative advantage to examine the static 
determinants of trade. The concepts developed here will be instrumental in analyzing the 
dynamics associated with country development and changing global demand that are 
considered in Chapter 3.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
primaries in terms of manufactures is expected to rise over time and the negative association between per 
capita income and the relative quantity of primaries produced is even more pronounced. 
 13 
2.2  TRADE AND SOURCES OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
A country may have a relative cost advantage in the production of some goods which 
forms a basis for trade with countries whose relative advantage lies in the production of a 
different set of goods.  In the broadest sense, comparative advantage in the production of 
a particular good implies that the country can “transform” resources into this good more 
easily than other countries.  In other words, if for a particular country the ratio of 
additional production of a particular good to the amounts of other goods forgone resulting 
from the reallocation of the factor(s) of production between industries exceeds that of 
other countries, then this country is said to have a comparative advantage in that industry.   
There are two standard approaches to defining the source of comparative 
advantage, one emphasizing differences in technical efficiency in production and the 
other focusing on the relative abundance or scarcity of productive factors between nations.  
Diverging technologies in production form the basis for trade in the standard Ricardian 
model.  The important feature of the model is that, given the homogenous input into 
production, there exists a constant rate of transformation between industrial output.  That 
is, each country is characterized by a linear production possibilities curve.  In the familiar 
two-country, two-good scenario a higher relative output to labour ratio in a particular 
industry will usually result in complete specialization of both countries in producing the 
good in which they are relatively most efficient.   
The Ricardian model offers a highly simplified view of patterns of international 
trade in that it does not rely upon knowledge of the source(s) of a country’s technological 
advantage in production.  Often these differences in “technology” stem from differences 
in the organization of production or disparities in the types and quality of factors 
employed.  They represent a gap in technical knowledge which, once embodied in a 
blueprint, a scientist or technician, machinery or some other tangible object, is perhaps 
more adequately described by a relative abundance (or scarcity) of one or more 
intermediate inputs.  This view is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin formulation of 
comparative advantage, where differences in a country’s internationally immobile factors 
or production determine the direction of trade. 
Owing to the theory’s somewhat more specific treatment of comparative 
advantage, we limit our attention to the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade.  Indeed, one of 
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the model’s main drawbacks involves the extreme difficulty in measuring the virtually 
infinite number of distinct intermediate inputs into each production process.  
Nevertheless if we consolidate the numerous factors into a few tractable groups – in other 
words, if we can permit a relaxation of the criteria that are used to define a homogenous 
input – then a number of desirable features of this model stand out when compared to the 
Ricardian approach.  The first is that a relative factor abundance view of comparative 
advantage is amenable to describing changing patterns of trade resulting from dynamic 
processes such as capital accumulation and resource depletion.  Somewhat related to this,  
the model is explicitly based on diminishing returns to each input, and is therefore 
compatible with a Solow-type model of growth previously discussed.   
 
2.2.1 The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model 
The precise model discussed here is derived from the familiar formulation of Paul 
Samuelson, in what has come to be known as the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) 
model of trade.  Each country is assumed to share identical technologies in the production 
of various goods and, in the simple model, identical preferences in the consumption of 
these goods.  Yet the production of each commodity involves varying factor intensities; 
aircraft manufacturing, for instance, may require more capital per unit of labour than can 
be presumed to be the case in, say, the textile industry.  Drawing upon the price definition 
of capital abundance, it follows that, in a situation without trade, in order for two 
countries with asymmetrical endowments of capital and labour to produce and thus to 
consume identical quantities of aircraft and textiles, the wage-rental ratio must be higher 
in the capital-abundant country compared to the labour-abundant country.4  This reflects 
the general property of the production functions for each of the two goods, which are 
characterized by constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to each individual 
                                                 
4 See Bhagwati (1997, chapter 2) for logical proofs of the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem using both the physical 
and price definitions of factor abundance.  Where the physical definition is used, the proof proceeds by 
showing that at a common commodity price ratio, a higher (X/Y) ratio is produced in the capital-abundant 
country (call it Country I) if X is the capital intensive commodity compared to labour-abundant Country II 
and, given common preferences (the ratio X/Y in consumption is the same in both countries), it is deduced 
that (PX/PY)I<(PX/PY)II, which is the basis for the argument that the capital-abundant industry exports the 
capital intensive commodity.  With the price definition, which is used here, (PX/PY)I<(PX/PY)II follows 
directly from (r/w)I<(r/w)II, where r/w is the price of capital in terms of the price of labour, which derives 
from a strictly quaziconcave production function (or declining marginal productivity in each factor) and 
hence a lower relative price for the abundant factor. 
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input. 5   Because factors of production are assumed to be immobile across national 
borders but are freely allocated between industries, this factor price differential exactly 
offsets the relative physical abundance of each factor.  Thus the relative per unit costs of 
producing textiles in the capital abundant country, due to the relatively high labour 
requirement, is expected to be higher than in the labour abundant country.  That is, in the 
single-factor Ricardian model the pre-trade commodity price ratio is shown to be equal to 
the inverse of the labour productivity ratio whereas, in the Hecksher-Ohlin model, it can 
be demonstrated that the pre-trade price of the commodity using the country’s abundant 
factor intensively will be lower than in the other country (Bhagwati 1997, p.40). 
 This result is summarized in Figure 2.2.  For a given capital to labour ratio in each 
country, the production possibilities frontier is represented by AkTk in the capital 
abundant country and AlTl in the labour abundant country.  Since the production of 
aircraft requires more capital relative to labour, output is relatively higher in the capital 
intensive country when all of its resources are devoted to aircraft production (Ak>Al).  A 
community of indifference curves, reflecting identical and homothetic preferences, 
determines the autarky price ratios in each country.  Here, the relative price of aircraft in 
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5 Strictly speaking, the production possibilities frontier is mathematically convex. 
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        Figure 2.2 
        Free Trade Equilibrium 
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terms of textiles is lower in the capital-abundant country in comparison to the relative 
price in the labour-abundant country, where a scarcity of capital makes aircraft relatively 
costly to produce. 
The implications of opening up the model to allow for international trade is that a 
country will tend to export commodities that are intensive in those factors in which the 
country is relatively abundant.  This proposition constitutes the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem.  
Also implicit in this proposition is that if the pre-trade prices are identical between 
countries then no trade will occur (Bhagwati 1997, p.41).  Because both identical 
preferences and technologies are assumed in both countries, at integrated world prices 
each country will want to consume (in terms of both their final and intermediate uses) 
equal shares of both commodities.   
Figure 2.2 depicts the new free trade equilibrium. Given that it is relatively 
expensive to produce labour-intensive goods in the capital abundant country (and 
likewise capital-intensive goods are relatively expensive to produce in the capital scarce 
country), the capital-abundant country gains by importing the labour-intensive good at a 
lower world price while at the same time selling the capital-intensive good abroad at a 
price higher than in autarky.  This change in demand that results also implies a shift in 
production.  At the world relative price of aircraft Pw, the capital-abundant country now 
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produces at point qk instead of at ak along it’s production possibilities curve, while the 
labour-abundant country moves from point al to point ql.  In this diagram both countries 
consumed cl = ck units of each commodity.  This is only a special case owing to the 
particular levels of production in each country and the resulting terms of trade.  The 
aspects of the free trade equilibrium worth noting, however, are that consumption now 
lies on a higher indifference curve in each country and that the relative quantities of each 
commodity consumed is the same in each country.  Another significant result is that the 
possibility for trade causes each country to become more highly specialized in the good 
that employs the abundant factor more intensively.  It follows that the more two countries 
differ in their relative factor endowments, the more highly specialized each country 
becomes in that commodity which is relatively inexpensive to produce and the higher the 
volume of trade between them. 
A number of other important properties of this model can also be derived. For a 
detailed discussion on these, including the Stopler-Samuelson and Rybczynski theorems, 
the reader is referred to chapter 5 of Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983).  As noted above, 
there is a direct relationship between factor-price and the autarky goods-price ratios.  
Specifically, a lowering of the relative price of a factor is associated with a lowering of 
the relative autarky price of the good that uses the factor intensively.  This result is 
intuitively obvious since the relative costs in the industry which uses intensively this 
factor is bound to rise.  This relationship also runs in the reverse direction.  If the relative 
price of a good in the economy rises, which in free-trade equilibrium implies that the 
relative world price has also risen, then the competitive rewards in terms of final output 
of the factor used intensively in this sector must also increase relative to the other factors. 
This raises the question as to how the relative prices of the productive factors 
differ according to the difference between the autarky and free-trade goods-price ratio.  
Here we appeal to the well-known factor-price-equalization theorem, which states that 
under constant returns to scale, free trade in commodities equalizes the relative factor 
prices in both countries as long as each country produces a positive quantity of each 
good.  A concise interpretation of economic logic behind this effect goes as follows.  
Each country observes a relative increase in the price of the commodity in which it has a 
comparative advantage since an opening to trade is analogous to a relative rise in demand 
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for this commodity.  The capital-abundant country therefore moves to produce relatively 
more aircraft and fewer textiles while the labour-abundant economy moves in the 
opposite direction.  Because a reduction in textiles production releases more labour 
relative to capital whereas the increase in aircraft production requires relatively more 
capital to labour, an excess demand for capital emerges in the capital-abundant country, 
causing a rise in the relative price of capital sufficient to establish a new equilibrium.  
Similarly the relative price of labour rises in the labour-abundant country.  Since the 
relative price of capital in autarky is higher in the capital-abundant country than in the 
labour-abundant country, the free-trade adjustment implies that relative factor prices in 
each country approach each other.  In fact, it can be shown that there is a unique factor-
price ratio for each commodity-price ratio, establishing the theorem (see Markusen et al. 
1995, Chapter 8, for a complete discussion on the uniqueness property of relative factor 
prices).  Moreover, a stronger result is that given identical factor-price ratios (and 
identical constant-returns technologies in each industry), the relative volume of each 
factor employed by each industry is also the same in both countries, yielding identical 
marginal products and equal real factor prices in both countries. 
The one snag in the above relationship is that each industry must be active in both 
countries.  However, if relative factor endowments are sufficiently disparate between 
countries, a situation where a country does not produce one or more goods might arise.6  
That is, if the country is sufficiently scarce in a particular factor, it may be cheaper to not 
produce the good that uses this factor intensively and to allocate all resources to the other 
sectors, importing the full quantity of desired consumption of the said commodity.  In 
such circumstances factor-price equalization may fail.   Although factor prices are 
uniquely determined by the value of their marginal products in the operating industries, 
the prices of the resulting goods, and hence the value of the marginal products themselves, 
are not since a rising price of the good will be compatible with continued specialization in 
its production (Bhagwati and Dehejia 1994).  A decline in the relative world price of the 
most capital-intensive commodity, for instance, will not result in a reduction in the 
returns to capital in the labour-abundant country if no resources are devoted to its 
production.  Naturally if the industry is inactive, no shift in relative production occurs and 
                                                 
6 For a full account of specialization under the HOS framework see Jagdish Bhagwati (1983, pp. 61-64). 
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relative factor prices remain unchanged.  However, the real returns to both factors decline 
in the economy that produces the capital-intensive commodity and rise in the economy 
specialized in the labour-intensive commodity.  In the case that two or more goods are 
still produced, the expected distributional effects among these remaining industries 
allows for only incomplete adjustment in relative factor prices.  In each instance the 
resulting real price of each factor will differ between countries. 
Understanding the circumstances in which factor-price equalization does not hold 
is desirable since one does not typically observe equal real wages across countries, 
particularly when examining differences between developed and developing countries.  
However, observed differences in factor prices need not be a result of specialized 
production alone.  Differences in the quality or productivity of the inputs, if not 
accounted for, may produce differences in the average compensation received.  Scale 
effects and non-identical preferences can also lead to different factor prices (Bhagwati 
and Dehajia 1994). 
Following the argument in the reverse direction, another important issue is how 
specialization in one or more commodities alters predictions concerning the pattern of 
trade.  The potential for some countries to specialize in certain sectors may influence the 
relationship between relative factor abundance and the volume of trade predicted by 
equal factor prices in each country.  As Schott (2000) points out, world production and 
trade is more adequately described by specialization in segregated commodity groups, 
and ignoring such specialization undermines the potential of the theory to explain the 
direction of trade. 
Within a two-factor, multi-commodity model of a two-country world, Brecher and 
Choudhri (1982) show that the factor-content version of the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem 
remains valid in the absence of factor-price equalization, and also holds when the model 
is generalized to include trade-impediments, intermediate goods, or additional countries 
(except when the first of these extensions is combined with either of the other two).  
Their paper extends Deardorff’s (1979) theoretical discussion of the chain proposition in 
the presence of unequal factor prices, tariffs, and intermediate goods.7  In Vanek’s (1968) 
                                                 
7 The chain proposition is the idea that, having ranked each commodity in order of relative factor 
intensities, all of a country’s exports must lie higher on this list than all of its imports.  Deardorff finds that 
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article on the factor composition of trade with n factors and m > n commodities, identical 
factor-income shares in each country means that the net factor flows through international 
trade will be uniquely ranked according to each country’s relative factor endowments.  
Even without factor-price equalisation, however, it is shown that a dollar’s worth of any 
commodity exported by the capital-abundant country uses absolutely (as well as 
relatively) more capital and less labour than a dollar’s worth of any commodity exported 
by the labour-abundant country.  Therefore in the multiple-country, many-commodity 
case, it is possible to identify a weaker form of the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem, or what is 
commonly known as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) theorem, namely that the value 
of exports from each country will on average be composed of relatively more of the 
abundant factor and relatively less of the scarce factor.   
 
2.2.2 Dissimilar Preferences as a Basis for Trade 
Continuing from the above example, trade need not occur between the two countries if 
either consumption in the labour abundant country is sufficiently biased towards textiles 
(the labour-intensive good) or if preferences in the capital-intensive country favour 
aircraft.  In both instances consumption demand bids up the price of the commodity 
which is relatively inexpensive to produce domestically, eroding the relative price 
differential and hence the motivation for trade. 
One prevalent source of variation in consumer preferences between countries is 
the level of per capita incomes.  Even where underlying tastes can be assumed to be 
fundamentally the same, we have already considered circumstances in which differences 
in per capita incomes induce discrepancies in the distribution of expenditures between 
commodities.  Insofar as some expenditures can be distinguished as necessary for 
subsistence while others can be classified as luxury items, one can naturally expect 
consumption in low-income countries to be biased towards subsistence goods, while only 
in the relatively rich countries would there exist a notable demand for luxury goods. 
Depending in which type of commodity each country (rich/poor) has a 
comparative advantage, wealth-varying preferences can raise or dampen the volume of 
                                                                                                                                                 
this propostion holds in the absence of factor price equalization, whether the inequality is the result of 
complete specialization or barriers to trade.  The additional assumption of traded intermediate goods 
invalidates the proposition only when in conjunction with trade impediments. 
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trade.  Whether one proceeds on the basis of technological differences (as in the 
Ricardian model) or differences in relative factor abundance in evaluating the direction of 
trade, a convincing case can be made for why the volume of trade is actually less than 
what is anticipated under homothetic preferences.  In the Ricardian model, a positive 
relationship between a country’s wealth or level of development and the technological 
advancement implies lower trade when the technologically “sophisticated” commodity is 
also characterized by income-elastic demand.  Similarly, income-elastic demand for the 
capital intensive good implies lower trade given a positive relationship between per 
capita income and aggregate capital stock per worker.   
This is in fact what some recent studies have found.  Deviations from homothetic 
demand are found to be significant in explaining country trade patterns in Hunter (1991) 
and Hunter and Markusen (1988), where particularly low income elasticity is estimated 
for the demand for food.  To gain a sense of the degree to which preferences might affect 
the pattern of trade, Hunter and Markusen (1988) estimate the volume of trade potentially 
explained by varying income elasticities in a static context by measuring the difference 
between actual consumption of each commodity group and a homothetic consumption 
share of each good based on the world average.8   They estimate that due to differences in 
per capita income alone, 13.4% of all consumption expenditures are traded. 
Hunter (1991) extends this analysis to conduct a counterfactual exercise aimed at 
measuring the (potential) volume of trade owed to non-homothetic preferences.  To 
accomplish this, she draws upon earlier work (Hunter and Markusen, 1988) in estimating 
a world linear expenditure system (LES), which provides estimates of the share of each 
commodity in a country’s aggregate consumption based on per capita incomes.9  The 
fitted values of consumption for each country are then used to estimate net trade flows.  
                                                 
8 This estimate abstracts from trade due to differences in factor endowments and price differences by 
assuming that each country produces each commodity in equal proportions.   The fact that this is only the 
potential volume of trade explained by non-homothetic preferences is emphasized; Linder’s (1961) 
hypothesis that production responds disproportionately to domestic demand, and the negative relationship 
between economic growth and the share of production that agriculture represents both suggest that actual 
trade due to income differences is less than this measure. 
9 A sample of 34 countries and 11 commodity groups is used to regress of the value of consumption on 
commodity prices and income, measured in real (purchasing power parity) 1975 exchange rates derived by 
Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1982).  The 11 commodity groups considered are Food, Beverage and 
Tobacco, Clothing and Footwear, Gross Rent, Fuel and Power, House Furniture, Medical, Transportation 
and Communication, Recreation, Education, and Other. 
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Next, trade flows are estimated using a “neutralized” or homothetic consumption estimate, 
where each country’s consumption is determined entirely by its share in world income, 
thereby equalizing the consumption share of each commodity in all countries.  The trade 
vectors corresponding to homothetic and non-homothetic consumption are then used to 
find total trade in each case, and the ratio is calculated as measure of the contribution of 
nonhomothetic preferences to trade.10  The estimated value of 1.29 suggests that under 
the assumption of homotheticity trade should be expected to be 29 percent higher in 
volume when compared to trade with nonhomothetic preferences.  In other words, 
consumer tastes may account for as much as one-quarter of inter-industry trade. 
Markusen (1986) devises a model that attempts to account for the low volume of 
inter-industry compared to intra-industry trade, focusing on the distinct roles of 
economies of scale and non-homothetic preferences.  Specifically, intra-industry trade 
involves trade in non-homogenous, capital-intensive, manufactured goods while inter-
industry trade occurs between manufactures exporters and exporters of a homogenous, 
labour-intensive commodity (possibly primaries).  Dividing the world between the 
capital-abundant ‘North’ and labour abundant ‘South’, it follows that intra-industry trade 
occurs between the northern economies, while inter-industry trade describes North-South 
trade.  The interesting feature of the model is that if low income-elasticity of demand for 
the labour-intensive good is assumed, disparity in incomes between North and South lead 
to reductions in North-South trade while increasing intra-industry trade in the North. 
A special note is made, however, that the connection between factor-intensity and 
income elasticities, namely that the commodity that is largely the subsistence good should 
necessarily be the ‘labour-intensive’ commodity, has not yet been established.  Where 
this hypothesis fails, it can no longer be said that nonhomothetic preferences cause North-
South trade to lag behind North-North trade, even though this might be the pattern 
observed.11  Nevertheless, the model formalizes one aspect in which trade is influenced 
by preference structure, and also incorporates taste for variety.  A heightened preference 
                                                 
10 “Total trade” refers to inter-industry trade only since by summing over the absolute values of estimated 
net trade flows intra-industry trade is, by definition, excluded. 
11 Markusen notes that trade between industrialized countries is very large in comparison to the volume of 
trade between the industrialized and developing world.  Schott (2000) also makes this observation, citing 
that out of the 25 percent of total US imports in 1994 originating from either wealthy or poor countries 
exclusively, 24 percent is imported from rich countries and the remaining 1 percent from poor countries. 
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for variety as incomes rise might explain why industrialized countries with similar 
endowments (or technologies) trade substantially among themselves in similar categories 
of goods, assuming that each country specializes in a unique variety or brand of the good 
concerned. 
 
2.3 TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED VIEW OF UNBALANCED GROWTH AND TRADE 
Having formally summarized the dominant theories of comparative advantage and trade, 
an important question is whether these perspectives of the open-economy can be 
reconciled with observed patterns of development.  In Chenery’s (1961, pp. 27-28) 
discussion of the various models in a general equilibrium framework, his chief criticism 
is that the notion of comparative advantage has principally been treated as a static 
concept.  In addressing existing conflicts between trade theory and growth theory, for 
instance, he emphasizes the importance of a dynamic concept of comparative advantage, 
whereby efficiency levels in production and quality of factors change over time, external 
economies may arise, and variable income and price elasticities affect an economy’s 
long-run terms of trade.  Since his critique of classical and neo-classical trade theory, the 
numerous developments in the field have offered new avenues for dealing with these 
shortcomings of the traditional model. In the context of the unbalanced growth path 
previously discussed, however, the present study is concerned with the last of these 
criticisms.  Examining the effects of growth and wealth-varying elasticities of demand on 
international trade is a preoccupation of the following chapters.  However, it will be 
useful to touch upon a few related points here before proceeding to the next section. 
First, in elevating the standard models of trade to a dynamic context, time-
dependent concepts such as capital accumulation and technological progress need to be 
taken into consideration.  An excellent theoretical discussion of how accumulation affects 
patterns of trade is provided by Leamer (1987), extending the standard general 
equilibrium Heckscher-Ohlin model to include three factors of production and multiple 
goods, offering a diagrammatical analysis of the expansion paths of the production and 
trade equilibrium as capital is accumulated.  By introducing a third factor, land, a number 
of different possibilities describing the development process can be offered.  Specifically, 
his analysis demonstrates that countries varying in relative endowments of land will 
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become involved in manufacturing production at a rate disproportional to respective 
changes in the amount of capital per worker, assuming industry is relatively capital 
intensive.  In a three-country example with four goods (two of which are particularly land 
intensive, and two others which require no land at all) and capital accumulation, the 
structure of production and trade in each country evolves along a unique path, with the 
relatively land-abundant country specializing completely in one of the land-intensive 
commodities. Oniki and Uzawa (1965), Kenen (1965), Findlay (1970), and Baxter (1992) 
provide other interesting examples of the effect of capital accumulation on international 
equilibrium over time.  The important point is that with capital accumulation, investment 
and hence a country’s relative endowments become endogenous.   
Mussa (1979) examines the effects of asymmetric technological change on 
resource-allocation between two sectors and on factor prices, demonstrating that the 
effect of Hicks neutral technological change is analogous to the effect of a rising relative 
price of output in the rapidly expanding sector since, owing to a higher level of technical 
efficiency, the firm can afford to pay more for its factor inputs and still maintain zero 
profits.  As previously noted in the section dealing with unbalanced growth, low average 
productivity growth in a given sector translates into a gradual rise in the relative costs of 
producing the commodity concerned, while its relative share of production and 
consumption over time in the closed economy depends on relative price and income 
elasticities of demand.  With international trade in both physical capital and consumer 
goods, however, this axiomatic correspondence between domestic production and 
consumption no longer holds.  However, higher relative productivity growth in a 
particular sector will result, assuming international prices do not change, in an increasing 
portion of productive resources employed in this sector. In the language of the Ricardian 
theory, differences in technology and hence a country’s relative cost advantage may be a 
result of the production process itself, such as the concept of learning-by-doing 
eloquently formulated by Arrow (1961) and discussed at length by Lucas (1993), 
whereby labour becomes more efficient with the extent of past experience in production.  
Should opportunities for learned skills be higher in manufacturing compared to 
agriculture, this might account for much of the correlation between levels of development 
and the observed pattern of comparative advantage.  
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3.  TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS, TRADE AND UNBALANCED GROWTH 
 
The objective of this chapter is to explore the long-run relationship between 
development, changing demand patterns, and the composition of trade.  Much attention 
has been paid to the importance of international trade in economic development and yet, 
as noted above, the interrelations between trade and growth on the demand side tend to be 
neglected.   As Chenery (1980) observes: 
Sustained economic growth requires a transformation of the structure of 
production that is compatible with both the evolution of domestic demand and the 
opportunity for international trade.  This transformation normally involves a 
substantial rise in the share of industry and – except for a few specialized mineral 
producers – a shift away from dependence on primary exports toward 
manufactured goods as a source of foreign exchange. (p.281) 
 
This perspective emphasizes the simultaneous importance of domestic demand conditions 
and demand in the rest of the world in determining resource allocation and patterns of 
trade.   
From a general equilibrium standpoint, an analysis of the effect of changing 
demand patterns on production and trade should necessarily take into account both the 
intermediate and final goods sectors.  In light of the above discussion, it would seem that 
low income elasticities for primary consumption goods such as food provide a 
substantive basis for the general decline in the share of primary production.  However, to 
the extent that raw materials are used in the production of manufactured commodities, 
changes in the structure of production both at home and internationally can also increase 
opportunities for primaries trade. 
Keeping in view the effect of a general interaction between domestic and 
international demands on the pattern and volume of production, this section aims to tie 
together the concepts of unbalanced growth and comparative advantage discussed in the 
previous chapter as a basis for studying a typology of development.  Drawing upon a 
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simple neoclassical growth model to describe a hypothetical development path for the 
world as a whole, the potential for both diverging and converging trade patterns to arise is 
then considered for the case of the small open economy. 
 
3.1 EFFECTS OF GROWTH ON THE COMPOSITION OF TRADE: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON DECLINING GLOBAL DEMAND FOR PRIMARIES 
In Nurkse’s (1959) analysis of patterns of industrialization and trade during the first half 
of the 20th century, primary exports, which constitute the bulk of all trade in the pre- 
World War I period, considerably lag behind exports of manufactured goods by mid-
century.  In addition to falling behind the rapidly expanding manufactured goods sector, 
the volume of primary exports originating from developing countries begins to fall below 
industrial countries’ manufacturing exports for the 1955-57 period (Nurkse, 1959, 
p.20).12 
The main finding in his study, and the focal point of the analysis, is that demand 
for primaries has not kept pace with the vigorous rise in per capita incomes for the period 
under consideration.  Nurkse divides the sources of this asymmetric growth pattern into 
six ‘well-known’ characteristics of development.  For the present discussion, these six 
propositions can be summarized into three dominant factors relating to final consumption 
demand (or Engel’s law), intermediate demand, and government policy.  The first of 
these is addressed in the previous section.  The systematic decline in demand for primary 
commodities as intermediate inputs into production is explained by both the structural 
shift of industrialized country production from light to heavy industry, that is from 
industries where the content of raw materials in the finished product is high to those 
where it is low, and from a change in technologies, namely use of synthetic or man-made 
                                                 
12 This comparison in total primary exports excludes petroleum.  The exclusion is made on the grounds that 
oil deposits are “unevenly distributed gifts of nature, that they are exploited for export in only a limited 
group of countries, and that the great majority of underdeveloped countries have no means of benefiting 
from the present petroleum boom.”  Inasmuch as this lag in developing country primary exports is a 
consequence of wealth-varying preferences, a factor in which this analysis is particularly concerned, there 
is justifiable reason for excluding petroleum production from the primary goods sector from the demand 
side; namely, low elasticity of demand for food, a necessity/interior good will affect agricultural 
consumption and trade as incomes rise but will not ultimately affect consumption of petroleum or minerals.  
The latter primary commodities are more suitably classified as intermediate inputs rather than goods for 
final consumption.  Minerals also comply with Nurkse’s supply side considerations, but it is noted that 
mineral exports do not exhibit any significant trends, and hence their exclusion from the primary export 
measure would not alter the perceived dynamics. See page 21. 
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substitutes for raw materials.  Finally, it is noted that agricultural protectionism has risen 
among many industrial nations.  Since the levels of protection in most manufacturing 
industries have been reduced with the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in many 
industrialized countries over the past few decades, rising relative protectionism in the 
primaries sector may be a prominent concern even today.   
The separate effects of declining share of primaries in both consumption and 
production as the economy develops is empirically tested in Chapter 3 of Chenery and 
Syrquin (1986) for the 1950-70 period.  In a comparative study of roughly 90 countries, 
the differences in the composition of production and trade are examined as a country 
develops from a level of per capita income below $280 (constant 1970 US dollars) to 
levels above $2,100.  For the entire sample, gross aggregate industry output rose from 
151 to 182 percent of value added.  This increase represents the rising importance of the 
intermediate goods sectors in overall production, almost all of which is attributed to a rise 
in intermediate use of manufactured goods.  Intermediate demand for raw materials 
remains constant in relation to GDP.  There is also a marked shift in consumption away 
from primary goods towards manufacturing and services.  Thus at a global level the 
relative importance of primary production has diminished as world incomes rise, 
explaining in part the relatively modest growth in developing country exports. 
These results correspond more or less to Nurkse’s observations concerning 
industrial growth in the American economy.  He notes that despite the United States’ 
increased dependence on foreign raw material resources, the rise in demand has been 
rather modest in comparison to overall economic growth: 
- Over nearly half a century the raw material consumption of the United States has 
increased by 98 percent while its own production of raw materials rose only by 70 
percent.  As a result, from a net exporter of raw materials at the beginning of the 
present century the United States has turned into a net importer.  … the gross 
national product of the United States has, in turn, increased about 150 percent 
faster than its raw-material consumption.  Most striking of all is the fact that the 
United States manufacturing production has increased more than three times as 
fast as the American economy’s intake of raw materials (pp.24-25). 
 
This view stresses not only the decline in the relative importance of primaries in overall 
consumption but points out the gradual shift in the structure of production as the 
economy develops. 
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As the share of raw materials in aggregate world consumption and intermediate 
production declines, one would expect the consequent lag in expansion of primary 
exports to affect patterns of domestic production over time.  Steadily declining world 
demand, coupled with the eventual shift in domestic demand towards manufactures and 
services, translates into fewer profitable opportunities in primary industries, causing 
available resources to be funnelled into other sectors.  Given constant long-run relative 
costs in each industry, this shift in patterns of resource allocation is reflected in a 
tendency for accumulated or newly invested capital to be disproportionately allocated in 
manufactured commodity production.  Thus in a dynamic interpretation of the classic 
development model there are two rates of change to consider: the rate of expansion of 
demand (both domestic and global) and the rate of increase of productive resources 
relating to a country’s comparative advantage. 
 Previous studies by Chenery and Taylor (1968) and Chenery and Syrquin (1975) 
highlight a number of interesting observations that lend support to the hypothesized 
relationship between development and trade.  First, a comparison of small, primaries-
oriented and manufactures-oriented economies reveals a gradual rise in the share of 
manufactures in total exports associated with rising per capita incomes among both 
groups, although this rise is generally more pronounced for manufactures-oriented 
countries.13  A second and related observation made by Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin 
(1980) is that the relative contribution of primary exports to overall growth declines with 
per capita income while that of manufactures exports rises among all country groups.14  
Moreover, there is an even more pronounced decline in the relative importance of 
domestic demand for primaries in economic growth as per capita incomes rise.  Finally, 
notable differences exist between country groups.  While total trade gains in relative 
economic significance at each stage of development in the case of the manufactures-
                                                 
13 In Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986), multisector comparative 
analysis generally distinguishes between ‘large’ and ‘small’ countries based on total GDP, and between 
small ‘manufactures-oriented’ (SM) and ‘primaries-oriented’ (SP) countries accoriding to a tabulated trade-
orientation index.  The index, which classifies countries according to whether the relative contribution of 
primaries to total exports is lower or higher than the predicted average export bias, is described in detail in 
the Technical Appendix in Chenery and Syrquin (1975).  In Chenery and Taylor (1968), classification of 
manufactures-oriented and primaries-oriented countries is based on relative scarcity or abundance of 
natural resources. 
14 The percent contribution of each factor to overall growth, measured as the incremental change in the 
variable as a percent of the total change in output, is provided in Table 6.3. 
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oriented group, its contribution to growth declines on average for the primaries-oriented 
countries.  In both cases this shift is offset by a change in the relative significance of 
domestic demand. 
 These findings are along the lines of what we would expect.  Declining global 
demand for primaries results in a relative reduction in primary commodity trade, while 
the somewhat more rapid shift in demand at home consolidates the negative relationship 
between growth and the share of primaries in total output.  The observation that average 
percent contribution of exports to economic growth in the manufactures-oriented 
countries is rising while the importance of domestic demand declines – a pattern 
contrasted by the primaries oriented countries – can also be explained by non-homothetic 
preferences.  At low income levels agriculture typically represents the largest sector as 
well as the largest share of domestic expenditure.  The primaries-oriented country will 
begin by exporting agriculture and importing manufactures, the relative demand for 
imports rising with income.  However, declining relative global demand for primaries 
results in an excess supply of agricultural exports, leading to the observed shift in 
production.  Because the additional manufacturing output is largely absorbed by rising 
domestic demand, imports are replaced by domestic production and trade is reduced.  The 
opposite is true for the manufacturing-oriented country, however, since the shift in global 
demand reinforces its initial trade orientation.  A more detailed examination of dynamic 
country trade patterns implied by non-homothetic preferences is the preoccupation of the 
final section of this chapter. 
 
3.2  EFFECTS OF TRADE ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
While the above discussion emphasizes the importance of growth in per capita incomes in 
explaining observed trade patterns, trade orientation is also an influential factor in a 
country’s rate of growth.  Specifically, different rates of total factor productivity growth 
in each sector will lead to varying rates of growth for the economy as a whole depending 
in which sector it is relatively specialized.  Since manufactures are generally 
characterized by relatively high productivity growth, an open economy that begins as a 
net exporter of manufactures in the early stages of development will tend to experience 
higher average growth rates in comparison to the primaries-oriented country.   
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This commonly noted observation has raised important questions concerning the 
role of trade policy in promoting long-run development objectives.  Echevarria’s (2000) 
analysis, for instance, offers some insight into the implications of long-run specialization 
for economic growth.  In a hypothetical economy where the world price for agricultural 
commodities is consistently higher than the autarky price, relatively more capital and 
labour are devoted to the primaries sector at each stage of development. Lower 
productivity growth in this sector means that the manufacturing-oriented country will 
converge to a higher steady-state growth rate when compared to the primaries exporter. 
Bernard and Jones (1996) reach similar conclusions.  The key issue addressed in their 
paper is the role of trade in precipitating aggregate convergence in growth rates among 
OECD countries, noting that the transfer of knowledge that is embodied in traded goods 
from industry leaders to its followers tends to increase productivity in the lagging country.  
However, trade also causes countries to specialize, and therefore aggregate convergence 
is unlikely given that each country’s output will not be equally distributed across the 
spectrum of high and low productivity sectors.  This suggests that trade has the potential 
effect of thwarting the “natural” or autarky development path of the economy since 
higher per capita income and the consumption of manufactures can be achieved even 
without increased production in the manufacturing sector.  While it is generally 
recognized that specialization in primary production is often necessary (and indeed 
beneficial) at early stages of development, the higher growth potential of many 
manufacturing industries has led some authors to call for the promotion of 
industrialization and manufactured goods trade.15 
Lower average ‘productivity’ growth should not, however, be taken to mean 
lower overall welfare in the primaries exporting country.  A consequence of trade is a rise 
in incomes in the form of additional export revenues. This in turn implies a rise in overall 
welfare and, through the feedback savings mechanism, a rise in investment and 
productive capacity in future periods.   This point is stressed since evidence of low 
income elasticity of demand for primary commodities has been used to predict a 
systematic decline in the terms of trade for countries that are heavily reliant upon raw 
material exports, as predicted in the well-known Linder model.  This justification for an 
                                                 
15 See Chapter 8 in Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986) for an overview. 
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import substitution strategy of industrialization is incorrect since the volume of imports 
supplanted by relatively inefficient domestic production involves a severe long-run 
welfare loss in comparison to the free trade outcome.  See Echevarria (2000) for a 
discussion of gains from trade when a country specializes in the low growth sector. 
Moreover, these predictions concerning the dismal long-run growth patterns of 
primaries-oriented countries are based on the notion that patterns of specialization will 
not change significantly over time.  Nonhomothetic preferences imply, however, that the 
share of primaries in global production must decline as the world incomes rise.  As 
Echevarria (2000) points out, this would suggest that over time a lower proportion of 
global resources would be devoted to producing primaries.  In the sections that follow, 
we describe how this shift in average global production can be linked to patterns of 
development observed at the country level.  It is useful to begin with the demand side 
with a model describing the average path of production and consumption for the world as 
a whole. 
 
3.3 A SIMPLE MODEL OF GLOBAL PRODUCTION 
The model chosen to investigate the average world pattern of production over time 
closely resembles the closed-economy models of Echevarria (1997) and Kongsamut, 
Rebelo and Xie (2001).  It should be noted that both papers differ widely in their 
assumptions, the latter being considerably more restrictive, and therefore lend themselves 
to different predictions concerning the behaviour of production over time.  Echevarria’s 
analysis devotes attention to the effect of different production structures and differential 
rates of technological change in each sector on growth of the economy over time.  The 
Kongsamut-Rebelo-Xie (KRX) model, by contast, abstract from such differences 
altogether, arriving at a hypothetical growth path featuring constant relative commodity 
prices and constant returns to capital.  The primary focus of their work is to provide a 
simplified dynamic perspective of development that is consistent with both the Kaldor 
and Kuznets facts rather than to consider the transitional dynamics associated with a 
reallocation of resources between sectors and their effect on overall economic growth.16  
                                                 
16 Kaldor’s facts stem from the observation that the growth rate of output, the capital output ratio, the real 
interest rate, and the share of labour in aggregate income are all roughly constant over time.  Kuznets, as 
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As a result, Echevarria’s simulations generate much richer dynamics which, given the 
close symmetry of her results with observed cross-country patterns of growth and sectoral 
trends in the value of output, will form an integral part of the theoretical discussion.  
However, many simplifying assumptions render the KRX model easy to solve, and have 
the added benefit of emphasizing the role of preferences in determining production 
outcomes.  Therefore even though this analysis begins by developing a rather unrealistic 
view of the representative economy by emphasizing the KRX development, more 
elaborate considerations and complications are introduced along the way. 
Both papers make use of a neoclassical growth model defined in terms of three 
sectors representing primaries or agriculture, manufactured goods, and services.  Each 
sector employs capital and labour, and exhibits constant returns to scale in both inputs.  In 
addition, the common assumption is made that physical capital is produced in the 
manufacturing sector and subsequently invested in each of the three sectors.  Intermediate 
product demand, therefore, is strictly in manufactured goods, ignoring the potential 
importance of intermediate use of raw materials in aggregate demand discussed above.  
Nonetheless, because most raw material inputs are used up entirely in the production 
process (in other words, they have a 100 percent depreciation rate), the effect of including 
the additional input in the analysis is of less interest than capital accumulation from a 
dynamic point of view.  Moreover, Kongsamut et al. dismiss the practical significance of 
including additional intermediate goods based on an examination of U.S. input-output 
tables, whereby manufacturing and construction account for between 90% and 93% of all 
investment for the 1958-87 period.  Finally, it is assumed that the representative economy 
has a fixed supply of labour which is continuously employed and normalized to 1 in order 
to isolate the effects of increasing productivity.  The production structure can thus be 
expressed by the following system of equations: 
),,( Att
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tAtt LKFA φΓ=       (3.1) 
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tMttt LKGKM φΓ=∆+     (3.2) 
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S
tStt LKHS φΓ=       (3.3) 
                                                                                                                                                 
previously mentioned, notes that growth in per capita income is typically accompanied by a shift in the 
structure of production out of agriculture and into manufacturing and services. 
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1=++ StMtAt φφφ       (3.4) 
1=++ StMtAt LLL       (3.5) 
ttt KKK −=∆ +1       (3.6) 
 00 >K       (3.7) 
The variable φi denotes the fraction of total capital Kt devoted to sector i, Li is the share 
of labour, and Γit represents the rate of technological change.  Labour and capital are 
completely mobile between sectors.  Primaries At and services St are produced for final 
consumption, while manufacturing output can be consumed (Mt) or invested (∆ Kt).   
Assuming that each production function is homogenous of degree one, this is essentially 
the same model employed in Echevarria’s (1997) analysis expressed in a slightly more 
general way.  
Assuming for simplicity a constant interest rate r, it is possible to consider relative 
price movements of the three sectors in response to differential rates of productivity 
growth in each sector.17  The present discounted value of profits in each sector, measured 
in units of manufactured goods, are given by: 
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where pi denotes the relative price of good i in terms of manufactures.  The firms’ first 
order conditions for profit maximization equate the marginal value products of labour and 
capital to the real wage and real interest rate, respectively (there is no depreciation of 
capital).  The resulting zero profit conditions in each sector are given by: 
,),( KrLwLKFp At
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17 In a closed economy model, the assumption of a constant real interest rate is unrealistic, especially at 
early stages of development where the capital stock is particularly low (see King and Rebelo, 1993).  
However, Kongsamut et al. (2001) consider a specific transitional path featuring a constant interest which 
they refer to as the Generalized Balanced Growth Path.  The assumption is therefore adopted for both ease 
of exposition and to highlight other  important differences between their model and the one employed here. 
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Making use of the profit-maximizing condition that the marginal product of capital is 
equal to the real interest rate, taking the natural logs for the primary goods sector and 
differentiating yields 
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where xdxxdx == lnˆ .  Recognizing that ),( AttAtAtAtt LKFLw φΓ  is labour’s share of 
output in the primaries sector, and denoting this share by LAµ , the above equation reduces 
to 
tLAAtA wp ˆˆˆ µ=Γ+ . 
Similarly, log-differentiation of the remaining two zero-profit conditions yields 
tLMMt wˆˆ µ=Γ ,              and           tLSStS wp ˆˆˆ µ=Γ+ . 
These equations can be used to solve for relative price movements Apˆ  and Spˆ in terms of 
differences in productivity growth between sectors: 
AtMt
LM
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Ap Γ−Γ⋅= ˆˆˆ µ
µ                 (3.14) 
 StMt
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Sp Γ−Γ⋅= ˆˆˆ µ
µ
.     (3.15) 
These last two equations show the negative relationship between the price level in each 
sector and its own relative productivity growth.  In the case of services, we obtain the 
familiar result discussed in section 2.1, namely, that should labour be used more 
intensively in this sector compared to manufacturing ( LMLS µµ ≥ ), higher total factor 
productivity growth in manufacturing implies that the relative price of services should 
rise over time.   Insofar as services are not highly traded commodities, the fact that the 
sector has been included in the model is strictly a formality that provides balance to 
production and consumption decisions.  Since the objective of this section is to examine 
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the relations between growth and trade, however, attention will be confined to the 
primaries and manufacturing sectors for the remainder of the analysis.  
In the case of the long-run tendency for the relative price of primaries in terms of 
manufactures described by (3.14) (remember that we are considering prices in autarky to 
simulate the world economy), the predictions are much less certain.  The KRX model 
predicts constant prices where two essential conditions are satisfied.  First, all 
technological progress must be labour augmenting, characterizing economic growth as an 
increase in the ‘effective’ units of labour employed in each sector rather than a neutral 
rise in the Solow residuals in each sector.  Second, all industries are defined by a 
common production function, each sector employing proportional quantities of capital 
and labour.  This assumption equalizes the rate of productivity growth across sectors, and 
as a result any relative change in the quantities of each good produced is brought about 
entirely by a reallocation of productive resources.  One is able to verify that under these 
assumptions equation (3.14) implies: 
0ˆˆ)1(ˆˆˆ =Γ−Γ=Γ−Γ⋅= AtMtAtMt
LM
LA
Ap µ
µ .   (3.16) 
These conditions provide a rather distorted view of sectoral production patterns. Large 
difference in average productivity growth between the two sectors are estimated in 
Echevarria (1997), and with the relatively high average labour share in agriculture 
estimated in Echevarria (1998) constant relative prices becomes a tenuous assumption.18  
An estimated average labour share of 0.41 for the primaries sector yields a LMLA µµ /  
ratio of 1.025.  We can use this ratio, along with Echevarria’s (1997) productivity growth 
estimates for the 13 OECD countries considered, to form loose predictions regarding the 
trend in the relative price of primaries.  Given productivity growth in each sector of 
%,4.1ˆ =ΓMt  and %0ˆ =ΓAt , it is clear from (3.14) that with no growth in the primaries 
                                                 
18 The updated estimates for average labour compensation in agriculture, based on Canadian data, provided 
in Echevarria (1998) are argued to be more accurate than those based on OECD averages presented in 
Echevarria (1997).  The reason for this is that a large portion of proprietor income, which in the absence of 
more detailed data is conventionally imputed as compensation to capital, is comprised of payments to other 
factors.  Canadian proprietor income statistics are categorized according to property taxes, cash rents, cash 
wages, room-and-board, building and machinery repairs, livestock purchases and interest, which are returns 
more appropriately divided between land, labour and capital in Echevarria (1998).   
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sector the estimated growth in pA will be positive.  That is, the expected rise in the 
relative price of primaries is an annual 1.435 %.   
We attempt to verify this prediction using United Nations producer price index 
statistics for 24 countries, the trend in the relative price of primaries in terms of 
manufactures presented in Figure 3.1.  It is worthwhile to note that the predicted and 
actual global price movements, apart from being based on a different sample of countries, 
correspond to different time periods.  Averages in Echevarria (1997) are based on the 
1976-85 period, while the UN price indices are available for 1980-1992 only.  To attempt 
to correct for the discrepancy in cross-sectional data, averages are calculated again 
restricting the sample to nine OECD countries, which do not include Denmark, Finland, 
France, and Norway.  The resulting relative price trend is presented in Figure 3.2. 
These figures indicate that the relative rise in the producer price is more 
pronounced for OECD countries.  A comparison of the estimated average annual growth 
rates for the two sample groups, 1.2% for all 24 countries and 2.0% for the OECD sample, 
reveals that our predicted growth rate in the relative price of primaries lies perfectly 
within the estimated rates of increase.  However, due to the small number of countries for 
which sector-specific producer price and labour stock data are available, and given that    
‘world’ averages are not weighted by total output figures, the estimated price movements 
present 
Figure 3.1: Relative Price of Primaries (1990=100) 
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Figure 3.2: Relative Price of Primaries (OECD) 
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a contentious view of world trends.  Nonetheless, the fact that these estimates conform to 
our expectations given observed productivity growth in each sector, the conclusion that 
the relative price of primaries is rising with time is not unreasonable from a theoretical 
standpoint. 
These findings highlight some of the limitations of the KRX model, where relative 
prices are assumed to be constant over time, in forming predictions about global 
production and trade patterns.  And while the more general model initially employed by 
Echevarria (1997) provides a more accurate description the dynamics we are attempting 
to explain, the KRX model enables us to consider a simple analytical, closed-form solution 
to the system without becoming heavily involved in specifying additional equilibrium 
conditions.  In turn, very similar processes are arrived at with considerably less 
computational effort.   
The crucial point in both papers is that conceding to the notion of general non-
homotheticity of preferences is necessary to explain the observed downward trend in the 
relative share of primaries in the value of output over time, including the upward trend in 
services, regardless of how relative prices behave.  The theoretical discussion in the 
previous chapter, however, emphasizes the important role of relative prices in 
determining trade patterns.  We address this issue by considering relative price changes 
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diagrammatically rather than formally in the following section.  For the moment we shall 
return to the transformation of production hypothesized by the KRX framework. 
Given the economy’s production structure, allocation of factors between sectors, 
and hence relative output, requires specific demand assumptions.  As is well known, the 
Cobb-Douglas specification which features homothetic demand and elasticity of 
substitution equal to unity is not capable of explaining movements in the relative shares 
of each commodity consumed.  A discrete analog of the preference structure proposed in 
their model can be expressed as: 
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where 1=++ θγβ  and 0, >ρσ .  These preferences imply that the income elasticity of 
demand for primaries is less than one while that for services is greater than 1.  The 
variable A  is interpreted as the subsistence level of food consumption while S represents 
the amount of home production of services, which are substituted for hired services as 
income rises. 
 The optimal consumption path is found by maximizing (3.18) subject to the budget 
constraint: 
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where itL  represents the effective units of labour employed in sector i.  Since production 
in each sector is ‘proportional’ (F,G, and H are the same), constant relative prices 
AtMtAp ΓΓ= and StMtSp ΓΓ= permit simplification of the budget constraint to: 
),( ttMttStAtt LKFSpApKM Γ=++∆+ . 
Again it is stressed that the assumptions of constant prices and equal factor intensities in 
each sector, while they seem tenuous given the above discussion, greatly simplify the 
analysis.  The model enables a clear view of how non-homothetic preferences determine 
the equilibrium outcome, and from this point it is easier to consider cases where these 
properties do not hold. 
 Solving the first order conditions for the consumption shares of primaries in terms 
of manufactures yields 
 39 
ApMAp AttA += γ
β       (3.19) 
Rearranging terms and log-differentiation (remembering to hold prices constant) implies 
the following growth relation between the manufacturing and primaries sectors: 
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What their model serves to show is that at low levels of per capita income (or 
equivalently at low A, and Mt), output in each sector does not expand at the same rate.  
Growth in manufacturing production is constrained by the rate of technological progress 
(denoted in their model by g), while for At close to subsistence the primaries sector grows 
at a rate less than g.  As income rises, however, the subsistence minimum loses 
importance, yielding asymptotic growth rate g in each sector.  Since relative prices are 
assumed constant, the differential growth rates at lower income levels suggest a decline 
in the primary shares of both output and employment. 
Figure 3.3 depicts the implied expansion path of production and consumption of 
primaries and manufactures implied by the model.  Narrowing our attention to the 
tradable goods establishes the basis for examining potential country trade patterns below.  
Before considering the implications for trade, however, it is perhaps useful to relate the 
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diagram to the properties of the model.  The production possibility frontier (PPF) expands 
at a rate less that g since expansion of services is not represented in the diagram.  
However, manufactures grow at this constant rate while the primaries sector, initially 
expanding at a lower rate, demonstrates a gradual rise in its relative rate of growth.  The 
expansion path is such that the relative price of primaries in terms of manufactures is 
constant throughout (represented by the dashed line tangent to both the PPF and 
indifference curves).  At sufficiently high levels of income, then, both sectors expand at 
the same rate, and preferences do not differ significantly from homothetic ones.  
Therefore the consumption bias and production bias exactly offset each other at every 
stage. 
While this simple model could be used to describe the path taken by the global 
economy, the predictions do not fit well with observed trends.  To the extent that the 
relative price of primaries rises over time, it is instrumental to consider the marked 
difference in TFP growth between the two sectors documented in Echevarria (1997).  
Introducing the possibility of a higher average Solow residual in manufacturing leads to 
higher relative productivity growth in manufactures at every stage, independent of 
demand conditions.  As can be seen in Figure 3.4, this implies a gradual rise in the 
relative price of primaries.  The quantitative share of primary commodities produced and 
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consumed also expands at a slower rate relative to manufactures (taking into account the 
price effect on relative demand).  In terms of the relative share of each sector in aggregate 
expenditure, however, the expansion path represented in both figures are identical. 
 
3.4 DYNAMICS OF TRADE CONSIDERED 
Based on these hypothesized global production and consumption patterns, we are able to 
form certain expectations concerning the evolution of the sectoral composition of world 
trade between primaries and manufactures.  The first is tied directly to the relative shares 
of each composite good in production and consumption at each stage of development.  As 
the world PPF expands outward, the representative share of manufactures graduates from 
a percentage of primary production and consumption to accounting for the greater part of 
overall economic activity.  Since the commodities exchanged in world markets are a 
natural reflection of what is both produced and consumed, this result implies that over 
time, or as world incomes rise, the share of primaries in global trade should decline.  
Specifically, non-homothetic preferences imply: 
W
M
W
A EE ˆˆ <                                                            (3.21) 
where WiEˆ  represents growth in world exports (or equivalently imports) of commodity i, 
and where there is no change in the relative price of the two goods.  When the gradual 
rise in the relative price of primaries is accounted for, the implied divergence in the 
relative shares of each commodity in global trade is amplified: 
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Equations (2.21) and (2.22) are not properties of the model (even if possibilities for trade 
were introduced).  Rather they describe a conjecture that the volume of world exports 
emanating from each broad commodity group grow in tandem with actual world 
production in each sector. 
 The second proposition is somewhat stronger than the first in that, apart from 
countries moving away on average from primary commodity production and trade, the 
number of countries that export predominantly primary commodities is anticipated to fall 
while the number of manufactures-oriented countries is anticipated to rise. 
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Keeping in view that there exists considerable trade within each sector, it is 
possible to contrast individual country patterns of production and trade by allowing for 
initial differences in relative endowments of factors of production.  There are indeed 
other important determinants of trade, including domestic trade policies such as import-
substitution which has been popular in many developing countries.  Country size also has 
a tendency to affect the volume of trade, since in producing a large variety of products 
there is generally a reduced reliance upon foreign imports.19  For these reasons the actual 
mix of goods traded may not be adequately reflected in the goods domestically produced.  
For the present purpose, however, it is assumed that each country is similar in openness, 
size, and preferences, and as a consequence that the availability of productive resources is 
the only source of differences in patterns of production. Given these assumption, the 
trajectory of average world demands and relative prices derived in the previous section 
can be used to examine different possible trade patterns throughout the development 
process.  This method of analysis parallels the two-country framework that typically 
characterizes HOS models of trade, where the small country trades with the rest of the 
world and, owing to its relative smallness, cannot influence relative prices.   
To simplify the analysis further, land is assumed to be the only input which is 
sector specific in the production of primaries, and which in addition is assumed to be 
fixed in supply.  The reason for considering this particular factor is that endowments of 
land appear to have a clear connection with the volume of primaries exported in many of 
the empirical studies concerned with testing various versions of the HOV theorem.  Its 
influence in individual country trade patterns will be considered in the following chapter.    
A relatively high endowment of land is reflected entirely in a higher intercept in 
the PPF on the vertical axis and, assuming land is relatively fixed in supply, its inclusion 
affects relative growth in each sector through its influence on allocation of the other 
                                                 
19 Bhagwati 1985, Chapter 10, conducts several cross-country regressions to estimate the influence of each 
of population, GDP, geographical area, per capita incomes, and percent share of manufacturing value-
added on the share of total exports in output.  The two size variables, GDP and area, have a significant 
negative effect on the volume of trade in both the linear and log-linear estimates, although area is only 
significant for some years.  Interestingly, Bhagwati’s regression of the share of manufacturing in total 
exports on the relative share in domestic production were the least satisfactory, yielding significant results 
only in the case of the log-linear specification and for 2 out of the 4 periods considered.  This suggests that, 
among other difficulties involving data aggregation, that comparative advantage has a relatively minor role 
in determining overall trade flows. 
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factors.  The conventional assumption of identical preferences across countries is adopted, 
and thus opportunities for trade arise from an interaction of the country’s own 
endowments and those of the rest of the world. 
Figure 3.5 depicts the production of primaries and manufactures over time in a 
primaries-oriented country, where a larger quantity or quality of the specific factor gives 
the country an initial comparative advantage in production of primaries.  Initially there is 
higher than average growth in the primary sector since, with a relative abundance of the 
fixed factor, more labor and capital are devoted to primary production. Over time, 
however, the comparative advantage in primaries ‘wears off’ with the accumulation of 
capital.  Since we are assuming there are no fixed factors in manufacturing production, 
this sector attracts a disproportional amount of accumulated capital (and perhaps skilled 
workers), absorbing also a larger proportion of available labour over time.  Capital 
accumulation also implies that the relatively fixed factor becomes less important in the 
production process.  For the manufactures-oriented country, the pattern of trade is 
associated with a more rapidly expanding manufacturing sector and relatively slow 
growth in primaries  (Figure 3.8).  The overall growth rates in the primaries-oriented 
country and manufactures-oriented country will also differ due to differences in 
productivity growth in each sector. 
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Relatively higher growth in the primary sector does not imply that the structure of 
production in the primaries-oriented economy will not eventually follow a process of 
transformation similar to Kuznets’ fact.  It is clear from this example, however, that the 
speed of transformation is dampened, the time required to reach commensurate levels of 
manufacturing production depending on the relative endowment of land and on how far 
behind the country is compared to levels of development in the rest of the world.  Given 
that this model predicts that primaries become more expensive with growth, high average 
world incomes translates into a wider discrepancy between autarky and world prices, 
amplifying the country’s comparative advantage in primary production.  Still, when 
taking into account the disproportionately high savings in relatively poor countries, a 
standard feature of the neoclassical growth model, it is possible for growth in capital and 
output to exceed the rate of increase in the relative price of primaries, leading to an 
eventual dampening of the comparative cost advantage in primary production. 
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4. INTERPRETING THE SECTORAL COMPOSITION  
OF GLOBAL TRADE 
 
In the theoretical discussion of the previous chapter, the relationship between economic 
growth and the pattern of global production implied by non-homothetic preferences lends 
itself to an explanation for the receding importance of primary commodities in global 
trade.  As the global economy becomes richer, shifts in overall consumption are weighted 
more heavily towards manufactured goods, marked by a corresponding fall in the relative 
importance of agriculture and raw materials in both final and intermediate demand.  To 
the extent that a large portion of manufacturing output entails production of differentiated 
technologies and consumer goods, one can also expect a gradual rise in the relative share 
of manufactures in international trade.  This chapter is an empirical investigation of this 
relationship, exploring the degree to which observed trade patterns are consistent with a 
country’s trade orientation and level of development.  
A few words must be added in linking the results presented to the theoretical 
discussion of country trade patterns.  As noted in Chapter 2, both the Ricardian model 
and the standard Hecksher-Ohlin framework with two homogenous tradable goods imply 
that the country exports only that good which is comparatively advantageous to produce.  
In the discussion so far, therefore, a simple view of the primaries-oriented country 
referred to a country exporting exclusively non-manufactured goods, when indeed no 
such country can be found.  No explanation for the large amount of trade in differentiated 
products within these extremely broad categories is needed.  However, insofar as the two 
aggregates make sense in terms of more or less dissimilar production and consumption 
characteristics, the hypothesized volume of trade in the above analysis is meant to reflect 
the relative importance of each sector in actual trade.  In the following sections, therefore, 
the relative shares of that the two aggregates represent in total exports is basis for 
evaluating a country’s trade orientation. 
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4.1  THE DATA 
The following examination of global trade patters draws upon data taken from Statistics 
Canada, which have been converted from the original SITC classification to an industry-
based classification system making use of the categories created by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US Department of Commerce.   The dataset spans over 
22 years, and consists of bilateral trade data for 165 countries.  The WBEA trade statistics 
are organized according to 34 manufacturing sectors and a 35th “non-manufacturing” 
group, which more or less corresponds to primary exports, but  not entirely so.  Details on 
commodity groups are provided in the discussion on aggregation procedures below. 
   
4.2  GLOBAL TRENDS IN THE SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF TRADE 
Trends in the total value of trade (measured in constant 1995 US dollars) for 
manufactures and primary commodities are presented in Figure 4.1, ‘Value of Trade.’  As 
might be expected, the value of total world trade has risen rather dramatically over the 
1970-92 period.  Save for a short period of decline during the 1982-85 period, the steady 
climb in world trade has meant a near fourfold increase in its total value, from $1.1 
Trillion to $4.1 Trillion.  This is compared to a more modest rise in world production   
(measured in terms of aggregate GDP – World Development Indicators [WDI], 2001), 
rising from $13.2 Trillion to $27.1 Trillion.  Thus exports account for an increasing 
proportion of overall production and income, rising from approximately 8% of global 
income in 1970 to 14% in 1992. 
This increase in the proportion of trade in overall income, however, can be 
attributed almost entirely to rising production and trade of manufactures.  World primary 
commodity exports have more than doubled in absolute terms ($336 Billion - $695 
Billion), while its relative share in total exports has declined.   Similarly, aggregate value-
added in agriculture as a share of total world GDP has declined in similar proportions 
over this period.  What one finds is that manufactures make up a rising proportion of 
overall production and trade.  The precise shares of manufacturing in total trade over the 
past few decades will vary depending on how the category is defined (i.e. whether 
processed agricultural goods are included), but the observed trend is unaffected. 
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Figure 4.1: Patterns of World Trade – value of exports (constant 1995 US dollars) 
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 Individual country ‘primary’ commodity export statistics have been aggregated 
according to two criteria in order determine whether or not excluding processed materials 
should make any difference in the analysis of trade patterns.  The reason for this initial 
investigation is that many primary product exporters worldwide could potentially shift 
between raw and processed commodity trade in response to changing technology, 
transport costs, or shifts in world preferences, and therefore could cause substantial 
variation in both aggregate share measures from period to period.  Because this analysis 
is concerned with comparatively long-run trends in the composition of the two aggregates 
in global trade, the objective is here is to first explore whether any independent dynamics 
exists in processed food trade, and then to appropriately lump this group into either 
category.  If, for instance, increases in processed food trade are offset by a fall in raw 
material exports, this counter-cyclical interdependence between the two sectors would 
suggests that they should be included together under the category of primary exports.  If 
another trend is observed, then it is perhaps preferable to keep to the initial WBEA 
classification of non-manufactured exports for the remaining analysis. 
As mentioned above, WBEA trade statistics are organized according to 34 
manufacturing sectors and a 35th “non-manufacturing” group, which more or less 
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corresponds to primary exports, but  not entirely so.  Upon examining the list of 34 BEA 
manufacturing industries and their concordance with SITC codes, it is clear that those 
SITC categories pertaining strictly to primary products (commodities produced and 
sold/traded before any processing, packaging, freezing has been incurred) are 
predominantly excluded from the list.   Exceptions include refined petroleum products 
and gases, metal ores and minerals (mining), wooden boxes and cut stone.  Industry 
categories ‘1’ and ‘4’ consist mostly of oils, extracts, flours, preserves, and other 
derivatives of the strictly raw materials and produce.  Since these two classifications 
comprise predominantly of what can be properly considered processed agricultural goods, 
values corresponding to these groups were added to the primary exports category to gain 
a sense of the magnitude to which lumping processed foods into one category or the other 
should affect the overall analysis.    
Figure 4.2 indicates virtually no unique global trend in processed primary trade, 
its share in global trade measured by the difference in the two aggregates ‘prim(0)’ and 
‘prim(0,1,4)’.  Its overall share in trade has remained more or less constant over the 1970-
92 period, accounting for approximately 10-12 percent of total world exports.  In the 
Figure 4.2: Sector Shares in World Exports 
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absence of any significant dynamics, there is no indication as to which category the 
processed foods sector belongs.    Upon examining country-level statistics, on the other 
hand, I opt to include processing with raw materials as a single category since, to the 
extent that the share of this sector in total trade displays some movement over time, it 
appears it evolves with raw primary trade in a counter-cyclical way.  A few examples are 
shown in Figure A1 of the appendix for Morocco, Mauritius, Madagascar, and Somalia.  
There exists a small number of countries that exhibit a significant upward or downward 
trend in the share of processed food exports, but in general the countries in the sample 
conform to the world average described by Figure 4.2. 
 
4.3  COUNTRY TRENDS ACCORDING TO TRADE ORIENTATION 
This section extends the search for uniformity in the composition of global trade by 
subdividing countries into what appears at the outset to be more homogenous groups 
based on trade patterns.  A survey of world trade data indicates that there exists a number 
of countries whose exports comprise almost exclusively primary products throughout the 
sample period.  Based on the preceding analysis of the rising share of manufactured 
goods in global trade, it is evident that such countries are few in number and combined 
size in comparison to the overwhelming number of countries gradually shifting away 
from primary production and trade.  There is also evidence, however, of a handful of 
countries moving away from manufactures exports into more specialized primary 
commodity trade.  Such trends are interesting from the point of view of the contrasting 
global patterns of development and trade discussed above.  Finally, there are also those 
countries that can be classified as predominantly manufactured commodity exporters at 
the beginning of the 1970-92 period and whose composition of exports has not 
significantly changed, presumably because they are particularly resource scarce countries 
or because a certain ‘steady-state’ level of development had been reached at the 
beginning of the period.   
The objective of this section is to conduct a detailed examination of export trends 
in each group of countries and to explore some of the underlying characteristics of 
production and development that may help to explain the observed differences in trade 
orientation.  The analysis also explores individual departures from the average 
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relationships observed within each group; this extension will serve to highlight various 
links between the nonconforming countries, and in many instances the observed 
similarities suggest that countries could be classified according to more detailed 
typologies, such as per capita incomes, resource endowments, and country size.  The 
analysis also shows that a country’s dominant pattern of trade is met with varying degrees 
of success among all groups considered. 
 
4.3.1  Classification of Trade Patterns 
Most of the empirical work on the patterns of global trade has focused on isolating and 
testing the theoretical predictions of existing trade models.  A host of exogenous 
variables hypothesized to influence a country’s domestic production and demand for a 
number of commodity groups relative to a world average, and the predicted excess 
demand or supply is tested against the observed international flow of goods and services.  
The present analysis proceeds in the reverse direction.  The strategy taken in subdividing 
the sample begins by identifying dominant trade patterns and, based on inter-group 
differences in other indicators, an attempt is made to explain the underlying causes of the 
observed patterns in terms of the theoretical discussions of previous chapters. 
 In sorting the sample of countries according to observed trade patterns, it is 
desirable to not only distinguish between manufacturing and non-manufacturing oriented 
countries but between those that are characterized by increasing or decreasing relative 
importance of manufactures in total trade.  This initial strategy adopted in identifying 
countries according to observed trade patterns examines country trade shares according to 
a “Markov chain” sequence over the entire sample period.  Countries are separated 
according to a) whether they have “switched” from being predominantly primary 
commodity exporters (the share of primaries in the total value of exports exceeds 50 
percent) in 1970 to exporting mostly manufactured goods in 1992, b) whether they have 
moved in the opposite direction, c) whether they export predominantly primaries at the 
beginning and end of the period, and d) whether they remain relatively specialized in 
manufactured commodity trade.  The four country groups are henceforth referred to as 
the “Primaries-Manufactures’ (P-M), ‘Manufactures-Primaries’ (M-P), ‘Primaries-
Primaries’ (P-P), and ‘Manufactures-Manufactures’ (M-M) countries, indicating the 
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direction of specialization over time. The corresponding list of countries according to 
trade classification, corresponding to the 162 countries for which WBEA trade data is 
available, is given in table A1 of the appendix. 
This method is a rather crude generalization of actual trade patterns since 
countries with relative trade shares exclusively above or below the 50 percent threshold 
are lumped into the P-P or M-M categories even when the actual trend is economically 
significant.  Therefore, an alternative approach is also tried in classifying country trade 
orientations.  For each of the countries in the sample, a linear trend in the share of 
primary commodities in total exports is fitted and tested for statistical significance.  
Those countries with a statistically significant positive trend are labeled as M-P countries 
and those with a negative trend identified by the P-M category. 20   The remaining 
countries without any observed trend are divided as before into two groups corresponding 
to trade orientation at the beginning of the period; countries whose share of primaries in 
total exports exceeds 50 percent in 1970 and those characterized by less that 50 percent 
are classified as P-P and M-M countries.  The alternative country grouping is given in 
Table A2 of the appendix, and the corresponding regression estimates are provided in 
Table A3. 
The new classification identifies the overwhelming number of countries that 
conform to the observed global pattern of increased manufactured commodity production 
and trade.  Among the much smaller group of countries characterized by diverging trends 
in the composition of exports, the most marked rise in the share of primary commodity 
exports has occurred in Bolivia, Chile, Norway, and perhaps Angola and Algeria (see 
Figure A2 in the appendix).  The remaining countries in this group have displayed a 
much more modest increase in the primary share, and in some cases the large variation in 
annual sectoral shares casts some doubt on whether they share the same long-run trends.  
For countries that display gradual movement toward manufacturing production and trade, 
however, the trend is generally much more pronounced, and significant inter-period 
fluctuations are only a concern in a few cases such as Gambia and Nepal.  While the 
procedure taken to allocate each country into the appropriate group was intended to 
isolate statistically significant trends in the composition of trade, a cautious examination 
                                                 
20 To measure statistical significance the 5 percent criteria is used.  
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of individual country data has the positive effect of identifying large disturbances in these 
trends.  This identification suggests perhaps the quality of measurement and reporting is 
less than satisfactory. 
Another potential explanation for the erratic behavior in the evolution of a few 
specific country trade patterns may be that the country is particularly small in size, and as 
a result may represent an insignificant amount of global trade.  In such circumstances 
small movements in world prices for traded goods could conceivably generate large 
fluctuations in the relative shares of total exports that each commodity group represents.  
Following Chenery and Syrquin (1975), we avoid the potential bias in aggregate 
estimates caused by such variation by simply omitting small “splinter countries” from the 
analysis.  The criterion used to identify this group of countries is those countries with a 
labour force of less than one million workers in 1990, as reported by the World 
Development Indicators (2001).   
We omit a second group of countries on the basis of the relative importance of 
petroleum products in total exports.  The WBEA database includes petroleum in the non-
manufacturing commodity category, and as a result long-run dependence on oil 
production and trade will be reflected in a large share of primaries in total exports.  The 
reason for excluding this group from the analysis is twofold: i) production and exports of 
Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members is largely controlled by 
coordinated government decision making, while exports of other major producers are 
likely to be influenced in the opposite direction, and ii) unlike most agricultural products, 
where petroleum is produced is entirely determined by geographical circumstances, and 
therefore changes in global demand for oil will be reflected almost entirely in the exports 
of the relatively small groups of countries where production is most highly concentrated.  
Because this study is not directly concerned with the isolated patterns of petroleum trade, 
countries excluded include OPEC members and other net petroleum exporters.21   
Each country omitted from the initial sample (‘splinter countries’ and net oil 
exporters) is identified by category in Tables A2.  Note that this omission leaves 143 
countries in the sample. 
                                                 
21 OPEC and net petroleum exporters are derived as listed in the Energy Information Administration, "Non-
opec fact Sheet," June 2001 (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nonopec.html) 
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4.3.2  Sectoral Composition of Trade and Output 
In examining differences in the structure of production and other indicators between 
country groups, the second (trend) classification method is used.  Since the hypothesized 
effects of a country’s level of development and relative resource endowments on trading 
patterns are complex, cross country patterns of development and trade should be 
examined according to the broadest definition of “trend.”  The ‘Markov’ classification 
has merit in that it accounts for the relative magnitude of a country’s orientation towards 
each of the commodity groups.  Thus in many instances identifying a country according 
to trade orientation based on whether the composition of exports has crossed the 50 
percent threshold is arguably a stronger criterion than merely attributing to each group a 
statistically significant change in export shares, however small this change may be.  
However, we must also concede that the 50 percent threshold has no a priori economic 
significance (apart from saying that exports in one sector exceed that of the other).  In 
identifying countries according to average trend, therefore, we allow for the possibility 
that two countries – one moving from, say, a 65 percent primary export share in 1970 to a 
55 percent share in 1992 and the other moving from a 55 percent to a 47 percent share – 
are following similar development paths. 
The average shares of primary commodities in total exports for each country 
group and five sub-periods are presented in Table 4.1.  The upper portion of the table is 
based on averages for the entire sample, which varies in size depending on availability of 
data in each period.22  The lower segment, listing averages derived from only those 
countries for which data is available over the entire 1970-92 period, is included since 
these averages provide a more accurate description of inter-period differences. 
The table shows the expected result of relatively higher composition of primaries 
in total exports for the P-P group in each sub-period when compared to the other groups, 
while the opposite is true of the manufactures oriented countries.  The P-M group is 
characterized by a rapid decline in the share of primaries, falling to less than 60 percent 
of its initial 1970-74 level by the end of the sample period.  Beginning with a roughly 
                                                 
22 The sample size listed for each sub-period refers to the number of countries reported at the beginning of 
the period. 
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Table 4.1 
 
Share of Primaries in Total Exports: Entire Sample
Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
Sample [119] [119] [130] [130] [130]
  Primaries-Primaries 0.829 0.833 0.849 0.828 0.794
  Primaries-Manufactures 0.618 0.603 0.551 0.464 0.360
  Manufactures-Primaries 0.603 0.640 0.697 0.719 0.705
  Manufactures-Manufactures 0.424 0.387 0.436 0.418 0.280
Share of Primaries in Total Exports: Compatible Sample
Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
Sample [119] [119] [119] [119] [119]
  Primaries-Primaries 0.829 0.843 0.860 0.837 0.805
  Primaries-Manufactures 0.618 0.590 0.523 0.436 0.342
  Manufactures-Primaries 0.603 0.640 0.697 0.719 0.705
  Manufactures-Manufactures 0.424 0.384 0.422 0.404 0.273
equal share of primaries in total exports, the M-P group is characterized by a much more 
gradual increase in this share, and indicates a slight drop in the share of primaries in the 
final sub-period.  This drop in the relative share of primary exports for the 1990-92 
period is noted in the first country category as well, and reflected in the relatively sharp 
decline in the primary export share among the manufactures oriented countries.  
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 link the observed export patterns to differences in the sectoral 
composition of domestic production.  Table 4.2 summarizes average domestic production 
in agriculture, manufacturing, and services as a percentage of GDP and as averages for 
the relative shares of industry, gross capital formation, and foreign capital inflows for 
each group.  These data are taken from the from the World Bank 2001 World 
Development Indicators.  The unweighted averages display, with few exceptions, a 
gradual decline in the representative share of agriculture in production for all groups.  
Perhaps unsurprising is the observation that the sharpest decline is experienced by the P-
M group. 
While the relative importance of agriculture in GDP has fallen on average for all 
countries, this has not translated into a parallel rise in manufacturing production in each 
group.  For the first three groups, manufacturing production has roughly remained 
constant over the entire 1970-92 period, while the relative share of the sector in GDP 
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Table 4.2 
Value Added by Sector (% GDP): World Bank
Agriculture 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
  Primaries-Primaries 31.8 29.1 25.4 26.4 25.7
  Primaries-Manufactures 26.1 22.8 21.2 19.8 18.4
  Manufactures-Primaries 28.1 28.4 24.4 24.3 24.6
  Manufactures-Manufactures 19.7 20.1 18.0 19.7 19.3
Manufacturing
  Primaries-Primaries 13.1 12.3 11.5 12.8 12.9
  Primaries-Manufactures 15.8 16.9 16.4 16.6 16.0
  Manufactures-Primaries 13.3 13.1 13.3 13.1 14.2
  Manufactures-Manufactures 17.7 16.1 15.6 15.8 14.4
Services
  Primaries-Primaries 44.7 46.4 48.0 48.9 49.1
  Primaries-Manufactures 46.5 46.4 48.0 50.1 52.5
  Manufactures-Primaries 40.8 44.2 47.7 46.4 45.9
  Manufactures-Manufactures 47.8 48.1 53.4 52.2 53.3
Industry 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
  Primaries-Primaries 23.4 24.5 26.6 25.6 25.7
  Primaries-Manufactures 27.6 30.9 30.8 30.1 29.1
  Manufactures-Primaries 31.0 27.5 27.9 29.3 29.5
  Manufactures-Manufactures 32.5 31.8 28.6 28.1 27.4
Gross capital formation 
  Primaries-Primaries 19.2 25.4 25.4 22.7 20.8
  Primaries-Manufactures 21.1 23.8 23.7 22.0 22.2
  Manufactures-Primaries 21.5 25.0 20.3 18.5 17.5
  Manufactures-Manufactures 24.8 22.6 23.1 21.7 22.3
Financing from abroad 
  Primaries-Primaries 22.5 28.4 27.9 28.5 24.6
  Primaries-Manufactures 16.5 20.1 18.1 15.9 15.7
  Manufactures-Primaries 19.1 19.9 16.0 13.0 13.2
  Manufactures-Manufactures 13.7 13.5 12.9 12.5 10.5  
 
among M-M countries has declined.  This is explained in part by the rising relative 
importance of services in aggregate income for all countries.  The rising share of services 
provides only a ‘partial’ account for the dual decline in both primaries and manufactures 
since, unlike the sector production data in Table 4.3, the World Bank aggregates do not 
provide a complete breakdown of economic activity.  That is, the respective shares of 
value-added in agriculture, manufacturing, and services do not represent 100 percent of 
economic activity, while the categories listed in the United Nations dataset offer a full 
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Table 4.3 
 
Value Added by Sector (% GDP): United Nations
Agriculture, Fishery, and Forest 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
  Primaries-Primaries … … 34.2 32.6 31.3
  Primaries-Manufactures … … 24.6 21.9 20.0
  Manufactures-Primaries … … 28.9 33.8 30.0
  Manufactures-Manufactures … … 17.3 15.9 13.0
Manufacturing
  Primaries-Primaries … … 11.6 12.7 13.7
  Primaries-Manufactures … … 16.8 17.6 17.7
  Manufactures-Primaries … … 13.6 14.3 15.5
  Manufactures-Manufactures … … 17.3 16.2 18.1
Services
  Primaries-Primaries … … 22.2 24.7 25.3
  Primaries-Manufactures … … 21.8 22.1 22.8
  Manufactures-Primaries … … 23.0 21.3 23.1
  Manufactures-Manufactures … … 24.8 26.0 25.6
Energy 
  Primaries-Primaries … … 1.2 1.4 1.8
  Primaries-Manufactures … … 1.8 2.4 2.4
  Manufactures-Primaries … … 2.5 1.8 2.2
  Manufactures-Manufactures … … 2.7 2.8 2.5
Other 
  Primaries-Primaries … … 30.9 29.5 28.9
  Primaries-Manufactures … … 35.6 36.4 38.1
  Manufactures-Primaries … … 32.5 28.4 29.2
  Manufactures-Manufactures … … 40.3 40.8 42.5
* Services includes wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage, and
 communication.  Remaining services are listed under 'Other'.  
 
account of domestic production.  The disadvantages of the latter breakdown of GDP are 
the relatively short period covered as well as the significant share that the unclassified or  
‘other’ activities represent.  Nevertheless, both tables offer insight into inherent 
differences in domestic production patterns for the groups considered. 
 Both tables convey the tendency for the share of agriculture in GDP to fall over 
time, with perhaps the exception of the M-P group, which has maintained a relatively 
stable share of agricultural production over the last three sub-periods.  The World Bank 
table shows a compensating rise in the share of services for each group, whereas no trend 
in the services sector is evident from the United Nations data.  Again, the relatively 
modest estimates for these shares suggests that many services are hidden in the ‘other’ 
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category, and therefore the narrow interpretation given to this definition of services may 
give an inaccurate depiction of actual country trends. 
To the extent that the relative fall in primary production and the rise in services is 
uniform across countries, these results only reproduce the previously cited evidence on 
the unbalanced growth path.   There is also some evidence of the tendency for the 
manufacturing share to rise, up to a certain point, and to then taper off or decline at higher 
incomes, a pattern also implied by higher income elasticities of demand for services.  In 
terms of tradable goods production, it is evident that the closed-economy interpretation of 
unbalanced growth cannot suffice in explaining the observed patterns.  In distinguishing 
country groups according to trade orientation, it becomes clear that the average rate of 
transformation in the structure of production is not uniform between groups, contrasting 
the predictions of the closed economy model.  We should carefully note that it is not 
differences in the distribution of production for any given period that warrant our 
attention since each country group does not necessarily represent, on average, similar 
levels of development.23  Rather the observed divergence in average sector shares over 
time, particularly where these shares were similar in one or more sub-periods, suggests 
that trade is significant in explaining the evolution of a country’s industrial structure. 
As discussed in previous chapters, trade allows for alternative patterns of 
development since the structure of production need not be tied to domestic consumption.  
Cross-sectional comparisons reveal the non-trivial bias of production towards that sector 
which represents a relatively large share of total exports.  These tables also suggest that 
for both primaries-oriented groups the share of primaries in domestic production may 
remain at levels significantly above those of the manufactured-oriented groups.  Given 
sufficient abundance of natural resources some countries may continue to specialize in 
the production and trade of primaries for a much longer period insofar as relatively high 
international commodity prices continue to favor terms of trade in this sector.   
A final observation is that average gross capital formation, which is presented in 
table 4.2, has declined considerably for countries moving towards increased 
specialization in primary products when compared to other groups.  Chenery and Syrquin 
                                                 
23 The following sections reveal, in fact, that average per capita income between groups differs quite 
dramatically. 
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(1975, Chapter 4) note that development based on the initial exploitation of primary 
exports often requires a substantial inflow of capital which, being used as a source of 
foreign exchange as primary exports rise, is subsequently used to reduce the balance of 
trade deficit.  As a result, there is typically a period of capital outflow for much of the 
transition towards becoming a developed economy.  This explanation is supported by the 
relatively sharp decline in foreign financing in later periods. 
 
4.3.3  Resource Endowments and Trade Orientation 
Availability of resources can be an important determinant of a country’s comparative 
advantage.  Differences in factor endowments are briefly considered for the sample of 
countries, and although factor inputs are classified into extremely broad aggregates, the 
data lend themselves to surprisingly straightforward comparisons.  The data set used was 
provided by Mohan Penubarti (the data is similar to that used in Maskus and Penubarti 
(1995)) and contains factor endowment data for all the countries in the Penn World 
Tables from 1970 to 1990.  Tables 4.4 and 4.5 report factor endowment ratios for each 
country and sub-period, including the period averages for each group.   
Included is a measure for capital stock, defined as the real net capital stock in 
millions of US dollars. This is the accumulated, depreciated, and deflated series (15 years, 
13.33% depreciation rate) of gross fixed capital formation in each country, measured in 
1000's of 1985 dollars at international prices.  Arable land and the area of forests and 
woodland measured in thousands of hectares are taken from the FAO Production 
Yearbook.  Values for skilled labour, defined as number of technical or professional 
workers, are also available for some countries.  The remaining labour force is counted as 
the number of unskilled workers.  It is recognized that the classification of different skill 
groups by distinguishing workers based on whether they are considered to be either a 
technical or professional employee can be misleading in the sense that large cross-
sectional productivity differences are likely to exist within each occupational category.  
However, data on labour productivity differences by occupation or industry is difficult to 
find for less-developed countries.  Nevertheless, the number of technicians and 
professionals in the labour force still provides some insight into differences in the labour 
market structure. 
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Table 4.6 
Factor Endowments: Entire Sample
Capital/Worker Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990
Sample [51] [59] [60] [61] [60]
  Primaries-Primaries 2.85 3.59 5.72 7.40 8.91
  Primaries-Manufactures 5.92 9.08 13.93 20.55 26.75
  Manufactures-Primaries 2.47 2.82 3.45 3.82 4.77
  Manufactures-Manufactures 10.60 14.78 20.09 26.89 34.23
Arable Land/Worker Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990.00
Sample [51] [61] [60] [62] [63]
  Primaries-Primaries 1.07 0.97 0.86 0.78 0.69
  Primaries-Manufactures 1.22 1.13 1.05 0.96 0.87
  Manufactures-Primaries 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.81 0.67
  Manufactures-Manufactures 0.67 0.64 0.60 0.57 0.46
Forest Area/Worker Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990.00
Sample [59] [61] [62] [62] [63]
  Primaries-Primaries 3.47 2.70 2.24 1.86 1.63
  Primaries-Manufactures 4.25 3.52 3.09 2.57 2.49
  Manufactures-Primaries 10.81 8.80 7.60 6.45 5.45
  Manufactures-Manufactures 1.54 1.46 1.39 1.34 1.30
Skilled/Worker Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990.00
Sample [0] [14] [21] [30] [34]
  Primaries-Primaries … 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.12
  Primaries-Manufactures … 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.17
  Manufactures-Primaries … 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07
  Manufactures-Manufactures … … 0.16 0.18 0.20
*excluding 1989  
Table 4.4
 
 The standard approach to comparing relative endowments is to consider factor 
ratios, although there is no preferred combination of factors in forming these ratios.  
Because individual observations are occasionally lacking in each of the endowment series, 
and in particular measures for skilled and unskilled labour are available for only a small 
number of countries, each of the available measures of endowments are presented here as 
ratios over the total number of workers reported by the World Development Indicators.  
Since unskilled labour typically makes up the largest category of factor inputs (for 
instance the ratio of skilled labour to unskilled labour is, on average, 0.16 for all 
observations, with a maximum value of 0.49 and minimum of 0.03), the calculated 
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Table 4.7 
 
Factor Endowments: Compatible Sample
Capital/Worker Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990
Sample [43] [43] [43] [43] [43]
  Primaries-Primaries 3.31 5.36 8.12 10.38 13.25
  Primaries-Manufactures 6.17 9.58 14.64 20.75 26.66
  Manufactures-Primaries 2.47 2.82 3.45 3.82 4.77
  Manufactures-Manufactures 10.60 14.78 20.09 26.89 34.23
Arable Land/Worker Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990
Sample* [52] [52] [52] [52] [52]
  Primaries-Primaries 1.06 0.95 0.85 0.77 0.72
  Primaries-Manufactures 1.22 1.11 1.02 0.95 0.86
  Manufactures-Primaries 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.81 0.67
  Manufactures-Manufactures 0.67 0.64 0.60 0.57 0.46
Forest Area/Worker Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990
Sample* [57] [57] [57] [57] [57]
  Primaries-Primaries 3.53 2.80 2.33 1.94 1.68
  Primaries-Manufactures 4.25 3.57 3.12 2.64 2.58
  Manufactures-Primaries 10.46 8.80 7.60 6.45 5.45
  Manufactures-Manufactures 1.54 1.46 1.39 1.34 1.30
Skilled/Worker Period 1987 1988 1989 1990
Sample [31] [31] [31] [31]
  Primaries-Primaries 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14
  Primaries-Manufactures 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17
  Manufactures-Primaries 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
  Manufactures-Manufactures 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20
*excluding 1989  
 
Table 4.5
endowment ratios can be interpreted as an approximation of the endowment to unskilled 
labour ratio. 
 Comparing calculated averages for capital per worker, large initial differences 
between groups are apparent.  Two things should be noted, however, when making cross-
sectional comparisons.  The first is that given the availability of endowment data the 
sample size has been substantially reduced, where the number of countries included in 
these averages makes up less than half of the initial sample.  For the M-P group, a 
particularly small group to begin with, the missing observations pose the most severe 
problem, since the number making up this group falls from 12 to only 6 countries. Thus 
the estimated averages cannot be comfortably taken to representative of the entire group.  
The second important consideration is the substantial variation in this measure among the 
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small number of observations for which data was available.  Bolivia, Chile, and Uganda 
each have very high capital per worker ratios in comparison to the average of this group, 
with that of Uganda ($7.84) eclipsing capital per worker even in Japan ($7.52)!  For the 
remaining countries, Paraguay, Malawi, and Zambia, capital per worker estimates are 
more in line with most developing countries.   
The general finding is that capital per worker is highest according to a country’s 
orientation towards trade in manufactured goods in every period.  That is, countries 
moving towards a larger share of primaries in total exports are relatively scarce in capital 
when compared to countries moving in the opposite direction, while those countries that 
have tended to exhibit the highest degree of specialization in manufactures are more 
abundantly endowed with capital when compared to all groups.  This finding is also 
revealed in comparing the average annual growth rates of capital-labour ratios for each 
group, where increased tendency towards manufactured exports is accompanied by more 
rapid accumulation of capital. 
 To gain a more accurate picture of relative movements in capital per worker over 
time, one should refer to Table 4.7 since only the compatible series are used in 
calculating group averages.  The table reveals relatively high growth capital per worker in 
the P-M category, with slower growth for the P-P group, and followed by the M-M and 
M-P categories in declining order.   While this suggests a strong relationship between 
endowments of capital and a comparative advantage in manufactured goods production, it 
is not clear that relative abundance of capital is the cause of comparative advantage in the 
static sense.  This is due to the fact that the net stock of capital per capita is expected to 
be a function of the level of development, and if for reasons already explained the relative 
share of manufactured commodity production is positively tied to development, then both 
ratios are endogenously determined.24  That is, since savings and investment are predicted 
to rise with income, a country’s net capital stock is tied to growth (the relation between 
trade patterns and levels of development is explored more fully in the following section), 
while in general production and consumption decisions are equally affected by rising 
                                                 
24 In much of the trade litterature it is commonly assumed that primary production is labour-intensive when 
compared to manufacturing.  While this “popular belief” has its roots in the empirical regularity of 
developed counties, abundant in capital per worker, exporting manufactures and importing primaries, 
Echevarria’s (1997, 1998) decomposition of average returns to land, labour, and capital in each sector 
shows that agriculture is more capital intensive than manufactures. 
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incomes.  Therefore it is useful to consider other factors of production which may have a 
more permanent role in explaining differences in a country’s patterns of production and 
trade. 
 Hectares or arable land and forests and woodland per worker are also reported in the 
above tables.  Comparing group averages provides weak evidence that trade in primaries 
is driven by a country’s stock of arable land, while the evidence is somewhat stronger for 
forest and woodland resources.  However if capital is also largely significant in 
agricultural production, as it seems to be, then the land-labour ratios alone will tell us 
little about patterns of comparative advantage.  In this case relatively high land per unit of 
capital is another useful measure of comparative advantage in agriculture.  It is 
interesting to note the particularly rapid decline in forest area per worker, representing the 
relatively non-renewable resource, among the primaries oriented group.  This suggests 
that a large volume of trade in primaries is achieved through the intensive use of 
resources that are relatively fixed in supply.  Based on the relatively large measures of 
forest area per worker, it is expected that lumber and wood products are prominent in 
exports from Bolivia, Cameroon, and Paraguay.  Nevertheless, direct aggregation of 
primary exports in each country according to the different categories should take 
precedence over such speculative inferences. 
 The last endowment aggregate for which data is available, skilled labour, is 
presented for each group in the last four rows of these tables.  The number of countries in 
this sample for which the measure could be imputed is small, rendering it difficult to 
draw meaningful inferences from a comparison of group averages.  While these averages 
could suggest a positive correlation between skilled labour and the share of manufactures 
in overall production and trade, this interpretation suffers from a few major weaknesses.  
First, insofar as our measure of skill is associated with the average level of training 
received by the workforce (which is implied in the measure of the number of professional 
workers), it is also a measure of human capital investment, and like physical capital, can 
be expected to be correlated with per capita incomes.  Second, this particular measure of 
skill cannot be interpreted as learning by doing or rising labour productivity in 
manufactures since, by classifying abundance of “skilled” labour as the relative number 
of technical and managerial positions, this trend is more properly tied to differences in 
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industry structure.  In other words, as a country specializes in manufactures production, 
one would expect a rising number of employment positions to inherit the titles of 
“managers,” “technicians,” or “professionals.”  Therefore such measures of skill are only 
appropriate when assessing the direction of trade for a rather specific set of industries. 
 
4.4 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE COMPOSITION OF TRADE 
An important consideration is how the composition of trade is affected by levels of 
development and alternatively how trade orientation affects growth in incomes.  
Measures of annual GDP growth and average per capita GDP in each group are presented 
in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 based on entire sample and compatible sample estimates 
respectively.  At the outset, one notes highest average annual growth for the P-P group in 
the first period, while falling below that of the P-M category in later periods.   Annual per 
capita GDP growth for the M-M group follows close behind the P-P countries in the 
earlier periods.  However, the higher average growth in the primaries-oriented group is 
not sustained over the entire period.  These findings, together with the fact that lowest 
average growth is experienced by the M-P countries in almost every sub-period, suggest a 
positive correlation between average growth and the share of the economy’s resource 
devoted to manufactured commodity production.  Evidence and explanations for this 
connection were addressed in previous chapters and do not need to be reiterated here.  
But while a country’s overall growth performance is inexorably linked to productivity 
growth in many manufacturing industries, periodic differences in overall growth rates 
between the groups should not be overemphasized without properly considering average 
levels of development.    
In the language of neo-classical growth theory, there is the issue of whether 
countries are still moving towards their steady-state growth path or if steady-state levels 
have already been achieved.  Certain countries may be experiencing unusually high 
growth rates where per capita incomes are particularly low, or rapid growth could also be 
due to higher savings rates or an increasing quantity or resources being dedicated to 
overall production.  A comparison of levels of per capita income in Table 4.9 lends 
considerable evidence to this hypothesis.   
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Table 4.6 : Per Capita GDP According to Country Group  
  
Average Annual Growth in Real GDP per Capita (1995 US dollars) 
Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92 
Sample [111] [111] [132] [132] [132] 
  Primaries-Primaries 3.268 2.149 0.387 0.598 0.247 
  Primaries-Manufactures 2.507 2.895 0.894 1.919 0.633 
  Manufactures-Primaries 2.007 1.811 -2.104 -0.375 1.479 
  Manufactures-Manufactures 3.094 1.282 0.645 1.767 -0.962 
Average - All Groups 2.708 2.446 0.484 1.400 0.427 
Average Annual Per Capita GDP (1995 US dollars) 
Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92 
Sample [111] [111] [132] [132] [132] 
  Primaries-Primaries 1797 2145 2373 2297 2371 
  Primaries-Manufactures 6316 7145 7053 7288 7904 
  Manufactures-Primaries 915 981 929 918 1055 
  Manufactures-Manufactures 9462 10409 11449 11547 10863 
Average - All Groups 5315 6006 6019 6172 6455 
  
  
Table 4. 7 : Per Capita GDP  – Compatible Sample  
  
Average Annual Growth in Real GDP per Capita (1995 US dollars) 
Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92 
Sample [89] [89] [89] [89] [89] 
  Primaries-Primaries 3.507 2.308 0.434 0.589 0.511 
  Primaries-Manufactures 2.500 2.378 0.798 2.132 1.094 
  Manufactures-Primaries 2.041 1.584 -2.133 0.373 -0.427 
  Manufactures-Manufactures 3.094 1.282 0.645 1.712 -1.334 
Average - All Groups 2.769 2.145 0.458 1.589 0.506 
Average Annual Per Capita GDP (1995 US dollars) 
Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92 
Sample [89] [89] [89] [89] [89] 
  Primaries-Primaries 1880 2247 2271 2370 2561 
  Primaries-Manufactures 6182 6849 7466 8311 9037 
  Manufactures-Primaries 968 1026 1065 1052 1141 
  Manufactures-Manufactures 10090 11098 12448 13777 13743 
Average - All Groups 5398 6001 6550 7234 7675 
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Interestingly, each group of countries can also be roughly categorized, on average, 
according to different stages of development on the basis of per capita income differences.  
Doing this conveys the perhaps significant result that the countries are specialized or 
moving toward increased specialization in primaries represent the lowest income groups, 
while countries moving towards increased manufactured commodity production and trade 
are those with relatively high per capita incomes.  This positive relationship between the 
manufacturing share and per capita incomes is certainly suggestive of, at the global level, 
an affinity between Kuznets’ fact and observed trade patterns.   
Consistent with the theories of growth already examined, however, we would also 
expect growth rates to be low initially and higher than average during the transition 
towards a mature economy.  Moving from the low income groups to those with higher 
average incomes, this is not the pattern that is observed.  Instead, the prolonged 
specialization in primary commodity exports exhibited by the lower income M-P and P-P 
countries is associated with a more rapid decline average growth when compared to the 
higher income P-M category.  Needless to say, this approach to linking the composition 
of trade with average levels of development fails unless it is known that the structure of 
production in each economy evolves along a common path.  With comparative advantage 
in trade and changing global consumption and production patterns, however, the 
existence of such uniformity in development is unlikely.    
To examine the relationship between development and the composition of trade 
more closely, the relative share of primaries in total exports is plotted against per capita 
incomes for each group in the cases where per capita GDP estimates could be found for 
the entire 1970-92 period.  The share of primaries in total trade at different levels of 
income is illustrated in Figure 4.3 for M-P countries, the relatively low income group.  
Figure 4.4 illustrates this relationship for the P-P group.  Because the P-M group 
corresponds to a relatively wide range of income levels, ranging from less that $200 to 
over $10,000 per capita, this group is divided at $2000 per person to better illustrate 
movements at incomes below this level, where the sample of countries appears to be most 
concentrated.  This group is represented by Figure 4.5.  Finally, trade patterns across 
incomes are illustrated for the ‘Manufactures-Manufactures’ group in Figure 4.6.  The 
 66 
Figure 4.3: ‘Manufactures-Primaries’ Countries 
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Figure 4.4: ‘Primaries-Primaries’ Countries 
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Figure 4.5: ‘Primaries-Manufactures’ Countries 
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Figure 4.6: ‘Manufactures-Manufactures’ Countries 
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share of primaries in total exports is also plotted on per capita incomes of all countries 
taken together for the years 1970, 1980, and 1990, and graphical representations are 
provided in Figure A.3 of the appendix.  In these figures lines are extended at the mean 
values of income and primary share in trade in order to illustrate both the cross-sectional 
relationship and average changes between years. 
In examining each of the figures, the hypothesized inverse relationship between 
the share of primaries and per capita incomes is explored for each group, as well as the 
extent to which this trend can be uniformly ascribed to all groups.  While this trend 
appears to describe the pattern of trade of many individual economies throughout the 
transition from low to medium incomes, a closer analysis reveals that there is a great deal 
of variation in the timing of the shift in the composition of exports.   
Within the P-M category, the rate at which exports shift towards manufactured 
commodities exceeds, on average, countries in the other groups for a given level of per 
capita income.  At approximately $5,000 per capita, this decline in the primary share 
begins to level off at between 5 and 25 percent of total exports, Argentina representing 
the glaring exception.  Notice that the pattern of specialization and trade begins to 
resemble the M-M countries which, at per capita incomes in excess of $5,000 per capita, 
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show a relatively stable share of primary exports within these same bounds.  This appears 
to be rather strong evidence in support of the hypothesized steady-state in the primary 
export share at high levels of development, where it is presumed that preferences 
resemble homothetic ones and the relative share of total expenditures that manufactures 
and primaries represent does not change. 
In comparing average income levels between country groups in tables 4.8 and 4.9, 
it was noted that each group corresponds on average to different income categories for 
the period under consideration.  However, when the Netherlands is excluded from the P-P 
category (having a per capita income in excess of $25,000 in 1992), the range of incomes 
covered by this group is similar to the M-P group.  Indeed, now both the M-P or P-P 
countries represent per capita income levels often well below $5,000, explaining in part 
the absence of a negative trend in the primary export share when the initial classification 
of country groups was made.  Other discrepancies stand out that tend to undermine the 
significance of average rising or constant primary shares estimated for these two groups. 
First, a large number of countries in the two groups with per capita incomes below 
$500 do not exhibit any significant growth over the period examined, and therefore long-
run development trends for these countries are ambiguous.  Indeed, these cases account 
for a majority of the countries in this group for which both income and trade data are 
available.  There also exists a fair number of examples in the ‘Primaries-Primaries’ 
category of negligible growth where per capita incomes fall below $500.  While it 
initially appeared that a fair number of countries were either remaining or becoming 
increasingly specialized in primary exports, it is now evident that only for a few countries 
can these trends be properly classified as a growth or development path.  But even for the 
remaining countries in these groups, specialization in primary commodity exports is only 
a temporary phenomenon.  While the evidence is perhaps less than striking, a number of 
countries appear to exhibit rising primary shares at lower incomes and falling shares after 
a certain level of per capita income is reached.   
In the ‘Manufactures-Primaries’ group, only Lebanon, Paraguay, and perhaps 
Chile accurately fit this description, with declining primary export shares after 
approximately $1500 in per capita income is reached.  In the case of Chile, the primaries 
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share rises in tandem with income until $3,000 - $3,500, and it appears there may be a 
tendency for this share to decline at later stages in the country’s development. 
For the P-P countries, there is again considerable variation in the timing of this 
shift; both Egypt and Syria have experienced declining shares at a per capita income of 
$700, while this transition takes place at much higher incomes for both Guatemala and 
Columbia.  Since countries in this group were selected on the basis of having no linear 
trend in the composition of exports over the 1970-92 period, it might have been 
anticipated that most of the ‘Primaries-Primaries’ countries exhibiting the inverted U 
pattern are near the ‘peak’ of the transition into manufactured commodity trade.  This 
also assumes, however, that positive growth is realized throughout this entire period. 
In addition, it is not certain that other countries in this group would necessarily 
exhibit trends that diverge from the average path taken by the M-P and P-P countries had 
a larger time-series been available.  Because a large number of countries in the P-M 
group have higher per capita incomes than most of the M-P and P-P countries, the 
potential for many of these countries to follow the same transition path cannot be ignored.  
A larger dataset covering earlier stages of development would be useful in verifying this 
proposition.  Countries such as Turkey, Tunisia, and Brazil are characterized by a gradual 
yet accelerating decline in the primary export share, and are easily compared to transition 
economies in the M-P and P-P groups.  However, they are also sharply contrasted by a 
more dramatic fall in the primaries share consistent with the cases of India, China, 
Pakistan, Malaysia, and the Philippines.  For these countries, the share of primaries in 
total exports declines rapidly at the lowest recorded per capita incomes.  Finally, there are 
those countries which at sufficiently high levels of development have not displayed any 
significant trend in the composition of exports, yet may have nevertheless subscribed to 
any of the observed low-income patterns in their earlier stages.  These countries are 
described by Korea, Portugal, and most high-income countries.25   
To summarize both the differences and the potential uniformity in the average 
transition paths taken by each country group, Figure 4.7 compares the approximated 
linear trends displayed by all countries during various intervals of per capita income.  
                                                 
25 High-income countries include countries with per-capita incomes that exceed $9,000 for the period under 
consideration, and are not shown here. 
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Figure 4.7: Primary Share and Per Capita Income – 
Comparison of Country Group Trends 
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These diagrams summarize at least two observations made above.  The first is that the 
primary export share in all countries, regardless of their initial pattern of specialization, 
shows a marked downward trend at higher incomes.  The second observation is that the 
timing of this shift toward manufactured commodity trade, while similar for both 
primaries-oriented groups, occurs at a much earlier stage on average in the manufactured-
oriented countries.   
While primary orientation can be surmised by a perceived lag in the average rate 
at which primary commodities are supplanted for manufactured goods in total exports, 
the heterogeneity that exists among countries within each group tends to blur the 
contribution of additional factors to diverging patterns of trade.  For this reason a more 
accurate depiction of global trade patterns is gained from a series of regression equations, 
each aimed at tying together the various relationships just described.  To capture 
hypothesized relationship between the relative share of primaries in exports and levels of 
development, each regression considers the effect of growing per capita incomes, denoted 
by ln(y), on the composition of trade.  These regression equations can be thought of as 
reduced forms of a more detailed general equilibrium system, where in the simplest case 
the observed trade patterns are determined entirely by changing domestic demand with 
rising income, demand in the rest of the world, and capital accumulation.  Specifically, 
we consider the relationship: 
 ( )wpdpp yyfyS ξξ ),(),()( Ζ=                                             (4.1) 
 
where )(yΖ corresponds to the country’s level of development (in the neo-classical 
growth model, a relevant measure would be the difference in per capita capital stock and 
the constant steady-state level of capital), and )(ydpξ  is the share of primaries in domestic 
expenditures.  Both of these variables are assumed functions of per capita incomes.  wpξ  
represents international intermediate and consumption demand, which is dependent on 
average world income and technological change. 
We estimate this relationship using panel data in order to capture both the cross 
sectional relation and the correlation of variables over time.  In previous studies on 
unbalanced growth (Chenery and Taylor 1968; Chenery and Syrquin 1975) cross-country 
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comparisons of production structures at different levels of development have been used to 
make inferences about the growth path taken by a single country over time.  Since time 
series extending more than a few decades are rarely available, large cross sections 
consisting of countries at various stages of development could better approximate long 
run relationships.  In estimating changing patterns of global trade, however, we would 
like to account for time-varying responses to factors such as rising world income and 
technological progress.  Chenery and Syrquin (1975, Chapter 5) indeed find that 
exogenous factors responsible for significant time shifts (such as technological change) 
are associated over long periods of time with such factors as rising income, resulting in 
substantially different estimates between time series and cross-sectional data.  In 
combining cross-sectional and time series data, we aim to distill both the average 
relationship between development and trade for all countries and how this relationship 
evolves over time.   
 In previous chapters we have argued that the observed decline in the average share 
of primaries in total exports can be largely explained by relatively higher total factor 
productivity growth in manufacturing sectors combined with income inelastic demand for 
many primary products.  For sufficiently low levels of income, we have considered the 
possibility that the export share that primaries represent may be sustained for extended 
periods where a relatively large endowment of natural resources results in a comparative 
advantage in primary commodity production.  In subsequent stages of development, 
capital and skills are accumulated and manufactured commodities begin to be produced 
domestically, resulting in a more pronounced decline in the primary export share.  For 
manufacturing oriented countries, the expected pattern of development is characterized a 
more rapid decline in the primary exports share in the beginning followed by more 
modest changes at later stages.  Thus even though the net effect of rising per capita 
incomes on the primaries share is expected to be negative, it is hypothesized that natural 
resource endowments will account, in part, for the observed differences in the timing of 
this transition.  To allow for such influences we might estimate a simple log-linear 
regression equation: 
 
ititititpit LlandLlandyyS )/ln()/ln()(lnln 2211
2
21 ψψββα ++++=        (4.2) 
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where i = 1,2,…,N refers to the number of countries in the sample, and t = 1,2,…T is a 
given year between 1970 and 1992.  The variables Sp, y, land1/L and land2/L represent the 
primaries share in total exports, per capita income, arable land per worker and forest area 
per worker respectively.  Due to the perceived nonlinearity of the primary share over 
varying income levels for a large number of countries examined, the proposed 
parameterization incorporates a first-order quadratic approximation of the income 
variable. 
While relative endowments of the other productive factors also have a large role 
in determining trade patterns, they are not included in these regressions because they are 
either endogenous to the system (and hence captured by the income term) or data are not 
readily available for many countries.  Capital per worker, as described in (4.1), is 
accumulated as incomes rise and thus falls into the first category. The relative 
endowment of skilled workers is also omitted since, in addition to the irregular and 
uneven availability of data, skills are also accumulated as the economy develops and are 
therefore assumed to be correlated with per capita incomes.  
Unfortunately the model presented in (4.2), otherwise known as a common 
coefficient or pooled regression model, does not tell us anything about the separate 
effects of time on the estimated relationship.  The common coefficients averaged across 
all t and i implicitly assume that the association implied with the dependent variable is 
stable over time and between cross-sectional units.  If, as has been suggested, global 
consumption and intermediate demand for primaries is declining relative to manufactures 
and in turn affecting the structure of trade, one would expect the average share of 
primaries in trade to be lower in later periods for any given level of development.  Cross-
sectional stability in the average relationship, therefore, would be a reasonable 
assumption only for a subset of countries characterized by similar per capita incomes in 
every period.  In our analysis, however, we consider countries spanning all levels of 
development in any given time period.  To compensate for maintained disparities in the 
composition of exports that arise due to differences in the timing of industrialization, 
cross-sectional dummy variables are added to the model.  Also concentrated in the 
dummy variables are the effects of omitted variables that have little or no change over 
time.  In the new regression equation, then, different intercepts eliminate variation 
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between countries while providing richer estimates of the average response of the 
dependent variable over time. 
The time-related pressures of changing global demand and technological change 
on country trade patterns raise another important concern.  When these omitted variables 
are related to per capita income and other explanatory variables through a deterministic 
trend component, the estimates of the regression will be biased.  Since both domestic 
income and world income – the latter being the source of declining relative consumption 
demand for primary commodities – typically trend upward together, the per capita 
income variable in our model exerts, in addition to its direct effect, an indirect effect 
through its association with world development.  By adding a time trend, a country’s own 
level of development no longer acts as a proxy for the effects of omitted variables.  In 
principle a time variable will capture temporal changes in the primaries share that are 
independent of changes in the explanatory variables.  The resulting estimated association 
between the primary export share and per capita income, then, is representative the net 
effect of two opposing influences – declining domestic relative demand for primaries 
which tends to raise primary exports, and the allocation of resources in manufacturing as 
capital and skills are accumulated.  Thus while the time trend captures the ‘universal’ 
effect of changing global demand on the composition of exports, the income coefficients 
should be interpreted as the average response to this shift in demand, net of changes in 
domestic demand, made possible by successive increases in physical and human capital 
investment. 
Because cross-sectional dummy variables also eliminate country-specific effects, 
the time trend can better approximate exogenous shifts in global demand that arise out of 
a combination of rising world income and changes in production technology and which 
are largely independent of individual country levels of development.  One might 
endeavor to distinguish between the two separate causes of changing demand by adding 
world income as an explanatory variable, yet due to the close association between rising 
world income and technological progress it would be difficult to interpret their individual 
effect.  The modified regression equation becomes: 
 
tLlandLlandyyS ititititipit φψψββα +++++= )/ln()/ln()(lnln 2211221     (4.3) 
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By allowing each country to have a separate intercept (denoted by ai) this model 
estimates the average relationship between a country’s export shares and the explanatory 
variables over the two decades considered.  Although we must again assume that the 
estimated relationship is stable across countries, the revised model imposes no 
restrictions on each country’s initial export bias.  In other words, a country with a lower 
per capita income is not constrained to having the same predicted primary export share as 
the high income country once the same per capita income is reached (holding differences 
in the other explanatory variables constant).  Unlike the standard cross-section regression, 
therefore, these estimates admit differences in the predicted composition of trade 
depending on differences in the time period or other exogenous circumstances in which 
development takes place.  In turn, we are essentially measuring the changes in the 
primary share associated with changes in income and relative resource endowments 
without regard to the timing of the transition. 
The results of regression (4.3) are reported in Table 4.8.  For the purpose of 
comparison, we have included the results obtained when restricting the model to contain 
a common intercept term and when regressed without the time trend (the first and second 
columns respectively).  As expected, the common coefficient model does not perform 
especially well when compared to the dummy variable regressions, suggesting that while 
countries will on average move towards more intensive production and trade in 
manufactured goods, the timing of this movement will indeed differ across countries.   
The estimated coefficients corresponding to relative resource endowments 
provide mixed results.  For the pooled regression, inclusion of the second land ratio 
(forest area per worker) helps to explain the composition of trade while Land 1 (arable 
land per worker) comes up as insignificant.  However, when the fixed effect model 
(without trend) is estimated, both resource variables influence positively and quite 
significantly the primaries export share.  The fact that arable land has no significant effect 
in the common coefficient specification highlights the large cross-sectional variation in 
endowments when compared to changes in the variable over time.  When the time trend 
is added, however, it is forest area rather than arable land per worker that has no apparent 
effect on trade orientation.  This result is not unusual in light of our previous observation 
that forest area, despite its positive effect on primaries trade, is being diminished on 
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average with time (see Tables 4.4 and 4.6).  Since a declining average endowment of 
forest area implies a relative fall in primary exports over time, the negative time trend 
coefficient is now capturing much of this correlation, with the level or static effects of 
higher resource endowments rapped up in the cross-sectional dummies.26 
We note that in both the pooled sample and fixed-effects regressions the time 
trend is highly significant and has the expected sign, albeit the estimated relationship 
becomes slightly inflated in the fixed-effects model for the reasons just mentioned.   
Another important implication of including the time trend is the change in the 
significance and magnitude of the income coefficients.  In both fixed-effects regressions, 
the estimated coefficients indicate an average decline in the primary export share at low 
levels of income, with the positive effect of the squared term capturing the tendency of 
the primary share to taper off as income rises (based on the figures already presented it is 
reasonably safe to presume that the average primary share does not begin to rise at high 
                                                 
26 In the common-coefficient model, the Land 2 is significant despite the inclusion of the time trend since 
the variable still accounts for much of the cross-sectional difference in primary export shares.  In the 
dummy-variable model, only average responses over time are estimated. 
  
Table 4.8: Share of Primaries in Total Exports – Panel Estimates -     
Common Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
Coefficient without trend with trend 
constant 0.4093* -- -- 
ln(y) 0.1614** -0.3540** -0.3307** 
ln(y) 2  -0.0165** 0.0159* 0.0184** 
ln(land 1) -0.0095 0.1376** 0.0910** 
ln(land 2) 0.0178** 0.0305** 0.0013 
time(t) -0.0042** -- -0.0044** 
Adjusted R 2 0.338 0.917 0.919 
Cross-sectional 
Observations 53 53 53 
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level 
** indicates significance at the 0.01 level   
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levels of income).  Since the explanatory variables are expressed in log form, the primary 
share of exports already exhibits an asymptotic limit at zero percent even without the 
inclusion of the squared income variable.  Thus the results indicate a tendency of the 
relative share curve to become flat at a level higher than this.  With the inclusion of the 
time trend the income estimates are even more highly significant, yet the estimated 
negative relationship is dampened as a result of the anticipated correlation between per 
capital income and the exogenous shifts in relative demand for primaries.  The final 
column (equation 4.3) therefore allows us to distinguish between the two effects.  The 
time trend coefficient estimates the relative decline in the share of primary exports over 
time independent of a country’s level of development, a decline that appears to be driven 
by primaries diminishing importance in both consumption and intermediate use.  The 
income effect captures the country’s average response to these patterns of global demand, 
net of changes in domestic relative demand for primaries, given the stock of accumulated 
capital and skilled workers.  The negative relationship described by our model is 
consistent with the results implied by diminishing returns to the fixed factors and 
dynamic comparative advantage. 
An important question is whether these estimates useful in describing the 
development path taken by a country in particular.  Indeed, we are able to conclude that, 
on average, the relative share of primaries in a country’s exports is reduced over time and 
at higher levels of development.  However, extending these predictions to the behavior of 
individual countries may be misleading if, due to a misspecification in the hypothesized 
relationship or the omission of important variables, all country trade shares differ not 
only in their ‘starting-point’ as suggested above but in their average responsiveness to 
exogenous changes as well. 
 Because each slope coefficient has been restricted to be equal across countries, 
cross-sectional peculiarities are captured entirely in the differential intercept terms.  The 
usual practice in pooling cross-section and time-series data, however, is to test for cross-
sectional stability in the estimated relationship over time.  If the null hypothesis of 
common slope coefficients for all countries can be rejected, then pooling the data as we 
have done may not be appropriate.  In turn, the estimated association between the 
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different series may perhaps offer an overly generalized depiction of actual country 
development patterns.   
To test the appropriateness of pooling country data, equation (4.3) should be 
jointly estimated for each country allowing for independent slope coefficients (in addition 
to the country-specific intercepts already assumed) and its statistical significance 
compared with that of the common-slope model.  The adjusted R2 value for the new 
regression is 0.967, a notable rise from 0.919, the value obtained from the restricted 
regression.  This suggests that some countries, if not all, display development patterns 
significantly different from the one estimated.  Since there is a potential for this 
difference to be entirely due to cross-sectional variation in the influence of a single 
explanatory variable, such as per capita incomes or natural resources, one may be 
interested in distinguish which coefficients are in fact similar across countries and which 
relationships significantly differ.   To test which variable(s) are responsible for the cross-
sectional variation in the hypothesized relationship, we constrain each coefficient 
individually to be equal for all countries, allowing all others to differ according to an 
estimated slope dummy. 
Since the restricted-slope model itself suffers from heteroskedastic variance, 
however, it is essential to correct for this for a legitimate comparison of efficient alternate 
parameterizations.  In conducting our tests of slope-homogeneity, therefore, we employ 
the standard F-test from the weighted-least-squares regressions.  Specifically, we test the 
hypothesis that the estimated parameters are jointly zero, we then try to discern whether 
restricting one or another variable does not result in a model which passes the test equally 
well (in essence we can determine whether the slope dummies are jointly zero for each 
variable at a time).  The F-statistic corresponding to each regression is reported in Table 
4.9, including those derived from our heteroscedasticity-corrected initial (all coefficients 
are constrained) and unrestricted regressions.  Note that both income terms are treated as 
part of a single relationship.   
The first statistic corresponds to the regression where “none” of the coefficients 
are restricted to be equal across countries. We observe that restricting the coefficients 
leads to a particularly low F-statistic in comparison to the unrestricted model.  In fact, 
using the appropriate degrees of freedom, conducting a standard F-test on each 
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Table 4.9: Comparison of Constant and Variable Slope Models 
constrained F-statistic degrees of
coefficient freedom
none 543.62 683
all 20.14 933
ln(y), ln(y)2 3.94 833
ln(land 1) 2.14 883
ln(land 2) 2.90 883
time(t) 3.48 883
 
 
individually restricted coefficient reveals that none of these relationships display cross-
sectional stability (in each case the null-hypothesis that the cross-sectional slope dummies 
are jointly zero is rejected at the 0.01 level of significance).  That is, the variable-slope 
model is more robust than each of the partially restricted regressions, emphasizing the 
inappropriateness of the assumption that each of the countries considered subscribe to a 
pattern representing the world average. 
 The clear implication of this test is that our estimate of 4.3 would provide 
inaccurate forecasts of development patterns in some countries.  For such predictions 
individual time-series estimates should be preferred.  The one drawback to this is that 
given the relatively short time series when compared to the wide dispersion in levels of 
development across countries, limiting our attention to individual patterns over time 
cannot provide a satisfactory view of long-run relationships.  In addition, combining 
time-series and cross-sectional data allows us to consider the direction of change in these 
average relationships over time for all countries taken together, which has been a key 
focal point in this study.  It is important to note, however, that rejection of cross-section 
slope homogeneity also means that the slopes and their statistical significance reported in 
Table 4.8 are not likely to be reliable. 
 Therefore even though our analysis of average global development patterns has 
been useful in uncovering several important relationships that would be have been hidden 
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in multiple time-series regressions, we have determined that the estimated averages do 
not represent uniform tendencies, suggesting that there exists considerable room for 
improvement in terms of the model employed.  It is almost certain that expanding the 
analysis to encompass other country-specific influences on trade, such as country size, 
government subsidies and degrees of openness, would be beneficial in this regard.  Yet it 
is also necessary to critically evaluate the alternate ways in which each of the variables 
considered might alter trade patterns.  As previously noted, the model used here may be 
incorrectly specified.  It implicitly assumes, for instance, that trade patterns are tied to 
development in the same way for all countries, while differences in resource endowments 
and time of development affect only the pace in which this transition occurs.  Going back 
to Figure 4.7, however, there is considerable evidence that the effect of differences in 
relative resource endowments on the development path is more complex than this.  
Although most countries appear to be moving in the same direction in terms of the rising 
relative importance of manufacturing in production and trade, a marked increase in the 
manufacturing share at earlier stages of development implies a smaller increase at a later 
stage in the resource scarce country.  Hence the different paths taken by resource-rich and 
resource-scarce countries are not accurately represented by the additive inclusion of these 
variables.  
 As a final matter to consider, regressions involving time series potentially yield 
spurious results where the series concerned follow a stochastic trend.  Although the 
present model accounts for the deterministic trend implied by changing consumption and 
production patterns, we cannot be sure that the resulting process is stationary.  That is, 
fluctuations in the share of primaries may be characterized by a directional response to 
changes in the independent variables, while the resulting magnitude of the share itself is 
entirely dependent on its previous level.  If, in turn, the observed levels in the primary 
share are determined by factors not considered in the model (the series follows a random 
walk), then simply removing the time trend will not necessarily correct for all spurious 
correlation with the dependent variables.  Only if the independent variables follow the 
same random walk can changes in each of the variables be attributed to a causal 
relationship.  Otherwise the situation must be corrected by taking the first differences for 
each variable and estimating the causal relation between such changes. 
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 In our model the assumed stationarity in each series becomes suspect.  The 
imminent trend in the average log of per capita GDP, for instance, is a deterministic one 
only to the extent that growth is constant over time.  In both our theoretical discussions of 
previous chapters, however, growth in per capita income is explained by varying savings 
and investment rates, and consequently the series is not expected to be stationary.  Yet 
varying rates of investment are also a source of changing comparative advantage, and 
thus influence the share of primaries in exports.  As a result, the estimating 4.3 in terms 
of the respective levels of each variable may still be appropriate.  This hypothesis should 
naturally be tested, rather than assumed.  A potential difficulty arises, however, in that 
having conducted a unit root test for over 50 countries we can expect to find series that 
evolve according to entirely different processes than the one just described.  Where an 
identical series must be differenced according to different orders of integration, it is no 
longer a simple matter of correcting for stationarity in the above regressions.  We will 
therefore leave exploration of this matter to further research. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The main purpose of this study has been to explore the interrelations between economic 
growth and the changing composition of global trade.  By studying patterns of 
development for over 140 countries, the analysis has attempted to explain observed 
patterns in the respective shares of manufactured and non-manufactured commodity trade 
in the context of a dynamic perspective of comparative advantage, linking together the 
various influences of resource allocation, factor accumulation, technical progress and, 
most significantly, global shifts in relative demand for the two categories of goods.  The 
results of the previous chapter indicate that while the traditional determinants of trade 
hypothesized in the static HOV model have important and interesting implications in a 
dynamic context, the extent to which resource endowments ‘explain’ the composition and 
direction of trade over elongated periods is limited.  In a general equilibrium framework 
resources can be re-allocated according to changing international demand, and our results 
suggest that rising world incomes and a corresponding bias in manufactured commodity 
use has had the most pronounced influence on a country’s average pattern of allocation 
and trade. 
In general, growth in agricultural and raw-material exports has not kept pace with 
the massive rise in manufactured commodity trade over the 22 year period examined.  At 
the global level, the relative share of primaries in world exports has decline from near 40 
percent in 1970 to a mere 20 percent of total trade, with exports from the manufacturing 
sectors accounting for the remaining volume of global trade.  Underlying this shift in the 
composition of world trade is an overwhelming number of individual countries moving 
towards increased exports of manufacturing goods; this trend is observed almost 
universally across countries, irrespective of the initial trade orientation, as the economy 
develops.  In fact, our attempt to interpret the peculiar tendency of some countries to 
either move in a direction opposite to the world average or to sustain relatively high 
shares of primary exports in the time-series data was rearticulated in terms of low or 
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negative growth in many countries as well as a conspicuous non-linearity in the 
hypothesized relationship between exports and levels of development, although a few 
countries prevailed in showing an upward trend.  Nevertheless, a detailed examination of 
development and trade patterns in even the primary oriented countries revealed notable 
downward pressure on the primary export share. 
Other observations replicate some of the important findings in Chenery and 
Syrquin (1975).  In their analysis a cross-sectional examination of developing country 
trade patterns at various per capita income levels reveals that while large differences in 
the importance of primary exports in total income do exist between primary oriented and 
industry oriented countries, distinguished largely on the basis of relative natural resource 
endowments, the differences are significantly dampened at higher income levels with the 
upward movement manufactured exports as a percent of GDP.  Similarly, our analysis 
describes the tendency for most countries to move towards greater manufactured 
commodity trade. 
Tied to this is their observation that a persistent bias towards primary commodity 
trade at higher income levels causes a country to lag significantly behind in export 
growth and, more importantly, to experience slower growth in output.  The present study 
again reports a similar finding – while a primary export bias contributes to high growth 
rates during the initial stages of development, often with rates that exceed growth in 
manufactures oriented countries, at later stages of development continued specialization 
is typically associated slower growth in per capita incomes.   
This gradual transformation in the composition of global trade, and the observed 
positive relationship between growth and manufactured goods trade, is explained in part 
by the fact that as incomes rise internationally, world consumption demand for 
manufactured goods increases relative to that of primary products.  A growing 
international bias in demand for manufacturing is also occurring in the intermediate 
goods sector where innovation and new technologies become superior substitutes for raw 
materials.  These shifts imply a perpetual emergence in manufacturing production and 
trade opportunities on the one hand, while on the other which countries have a 
momentary cost advantage in seizing these opportunities is also dependent on the 
particular level of development and on the relative abundance of natural resources.   
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While this study certainly shifts the focus of attention from individual country 
experiences in development and trade to the broad structural transformation taking place 
at the global level, significant to our findings is the substantial variation in the time taken 
for a country to become relatively specialized in manufacturing production and trade.  
This is evident not only from a comparison of country groups according to trade 
orientation but also in the dramatic improvement in the variation ‘explained’ by country-
specific dummy variables in our regression analysis of Chapter 4.  However, we also 
observe that individual development patterns are more complexly tied to development 
patterns than our simple model describes.  As a result, these static comparisons do not 
readily lend themselves to a dynamic interpretation of individual development patterns.  
Nevertheless, it is quite incorrect to concede that the perceived differences between 
countries are wholly attributed to variables that have not so far been considered.  Rather 
re-specifying the model to correctly account for the dynamic influence of differences in 
resource endowments may indeed provide a strong basis for evaluating trade patterns at 
the country level.  
Despite these shortcomings, many important insights have been derived from our 
examination of average global trends.  For many small open economies, we have noted 
that the relative importance of natural resources in determining allocation and production 
patterns is higher at particularly low levels of income.  This also suggests that the initial 
stages of development are characterized by an increasing volume of raw material exports, 
a trend that is reinforced by non-homothetic preferences.  At higher levels of income, the 
decisive importance of natural resources in determining allocation and production 
decisions is expected to dissipate.  Whereas the closed economy model predicts that 
countries at similar levels of development will reallocate productive factors towards the 
manufacturing sector at similar rates, with trade the above dynamics are determined not 
only by the country’s own level of development but also other countries’ stage of 
development.  That is, while earlier perspectives in development offered by Kuznets and 
others have emphasized the expected uniformity of world development patterns, and in 
particular that countries whose income per capita today is similar to that of today’s  
developed countries in the 1950s should witness similar transformations to those 
observed over 50 years ago, a country’s pattern of production and trade must be 
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alternatively viewed in relation to the level of world development, which has not 
remained the same 50 years later.  Therefore, the standard theory used to explain a 
common trajectory for country trade patterns is not inconsistent with a perceived 
divergence in both the magnitude and the rate at which this transformation is brought 
about in each country.  To the extent that a country’s own growth path is influenced by 
development conditions in the rest of the world, such cross-sectional disparity is expected.  
These conclusions are nevertheless taken to be a refinement rather than a 
departure from the ideas espoused in Chenery and Syrquin (1975), Chenery and Taylor 
(1968) and Kuznets (1971), among others.  Their search for uniformity in country growth 
patterns continues to be instrumental in our exploration of the important underlying 
processes of development.  In particular, the idea of the unbalanced growth path has in 
many respects supplanted the notion of an inherent dichotomy between developing and 
developed economies with the concept of a transition from one to the other.  Although the 
corresponding transformation in the structure of production is usually attributed to shifts 
in domestic demand, it has conventionally been noted in empirical studies that the 
composition of trade is of equal or greater importance.  From a general equilibrium 
standpoint, then, it is useful to link the concept of unbalanced growth to international 
changes in comparative advantage.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1: ‘Markov Chain’ Country Groups 
 
 
                    Group 1 (total =67) Group 2 (total = 60)
                  Primaries - Primaries Primaries - Manufactures
Afghanistan Kenya Bahamas Gibraltar New Zealand
Albania Lybia Bangladesh Greece Niger
Algeria Madagascar Barbados Haiti Oman
Angola Malawi Belize Iceland Panama
Argentina Mali Bhutan Indonesia Papua New Guinea
Australia Mauritania Brazil Ireland Peru
Bahrain Mongolia Bulgaria Jordan Philippines'
Benin Mozambique Cambodia Kiribati Poland
Bolivia Netherland Antilles Cayman Islands Korea, DPR Romania
Br. Ind. Oc. Tr. Nicaragua Central African Rep Kuwait Sierra Leone
Brunei Nigeria China Laos Singapore
Burkina Faso Paraguay Cyprus Liberia Solomon Islands
Burundi Qatar Czechoslovakia Malaysia South Africa
Cameroon Reunion Dominican Republic Maldives Sri Lanka
Chad Rwanda El Salvador Mauritius Thailand
Columbia Saudi Arabia Eq. Guinea Mexico Tunisia
Comoros Senegal Falkland Isl Morocco Turkey
Congo Seychelles Fiji Myanmar Turks Caicos Isl
Costa Rica Somalia French Guiana Nepal Uruguay
Cote d'Ivoire St. Helena Gambia New Cledonia Venezuela
Cuba St. Kitts Nevis
Ecuador St. Pierre Miq
Egypt Sudan
Ethiopia Syrian Arab Rep
Gabon Tanzania Group 4 (total = 32)
Ghana Togo Manufactures - Manufactures
Greenland Trinidad-Tobago Austria Hong Kong Portugal
Guadeloupe Uganda Belgium-Luxembourg Hungary Spain
Guatemala United Arab Emirates Bermuda India Suriname
Guinea-Bissau USSR (former) Canada Isreal Sweden
Honduras Vietnam Chile Italy Switzerland
Iran Western Sahara Denmark Jamaica Taiwan
Iraq Yemen Finland Japan United Kingdom
Zimbabwe France Korea, Republic United States
                   Group 3 (total = 4) Germany Malta Yugoslavia (former)
            Manufactures - Primaries Guinea Netherlands Zambia
Djibouti Guyana Pakistan Zaire
Lebanon Norway
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Table A2: Country Groups by Trade Orientation 
 
                   Group 1 (total =34) Group 2 (total = 88)
                  Primaries - Primaries Primaries - Manufactures
Bahrain Iran* Albania Guinea Poland
Benin Kenya Argentina Haiti Portugal
Br. Ind. Oc. Tr. Mali Australia India Qatar*
Burkina Faso Mongolia Austria Indonesia* Reunion
Burundi Netherland Antilles Bahamas Ireland Romania
Cameroon Nicaragua Bangladesh Isreal Rwanda
Chad Nigeria* Barbados Italy Saudi Arabia*
Columbia Senegal Bermuda Japan Singapore
Comoros Seychelles Bhutan Jordan Solomon Islands
Congo Somalia Brazil Korea, Republic of Spain
Ecuador St. Helena Brunei Liberia** Sri Lanka
Egypt St. Pierre Miq Bulgaria Lybia* St. Kitts Nevis
Gabon Syrian Arab Rep Canada Madagascar Sudan
Greenland Togo China Malaysia Sweden
Guatemala Vietnam Costa Rica Maldives Taiwan
Guinea-Bissau Western Sahara Cuba Malta Tanzania
Guyana Yemen Cyprus** Mauritius** Thailand
Honduras Denmark Morocco Trinidad-Tobago
Dominican Republic Mozambique Tunisia
Eq. Guinea Myanmar Turkey
Ethiopia Nepal Turks Caicos Isl
Falkland Isl New Cledonia United Arab Emirates*
Fiji New Zealand United States
France Niger Uruguay
Gambia** Oman** USSR (former)*
Germany Pakistan Venezuela*
Ghana Panama** Yugoslavia (former)
                                         Gibraltar Papua New Guinea Zimbabwe
Greece Peru
Guadeloupe Philippines
                     Group 3 (total = 16) Group 4 (total = 24)
                Manufactures - Primaries Manufactures - Manufactures
Afghanistan Lebanon Belgium-Luxembourg French Guiana Laos
Algeria* Malawi Belize Hong Kong Mexico*
Angola Mauritania Cambodia Hungary Netherlands
Bolivia Norway* Cayman Islands** Iceland Sierra Leone
Chile Paraguay Central African Rep Jamaica South Africa
Cote d'Ivoire Suriname Czechoslovakia Kiribati Switzerland
Djibouti Uganda El Salvador Korea, DPR United Kingdom
Iraq* Zambia Finland Kuwait* Zaire
* indicates OPEC members and net petroleum exporters
** indicates countries with fewer than 1 million workers in 1990  
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Table A3: Regression Results for Country Trends – Share of Primaries in Total Exports 
Over Time (1970-90) 
 
Primaries - Primaries Primaries - Manufactures
Country     CoefficienT-statistic P-value Country     Coefficient T-statistic P-value
Bahrain -0.0031 -1.539 0.139 Albania -0.0031 -2.822 0.010
Benin 0.0018 0.511 0.615 Argentina -0.0064 -4.436 0.000
Br. Ind. Oc. Tr. 0.0244 1.684 0.116 Australia -0.0051 -4.021 0.001
Burkina Faso -0.0072 -1.370 0.194 Austria -0.0031 -9.564 0.000
Burundi -0.0101 -2.133 0.053 Bahamas -0.0172 -2.202 0.040
Cameroon 0.0010 0.394 0.698 Bangladesh -0.0215 -6.822 0.000
Chad 0.0006 0.291 0.776 Barbados -0.0132 -3.873 0.001
Columbia -0.0031 -1.783 0.089 Bermuda -0.0141 -2.383 0.027
Comoros 0.0002 0.037 0.971 Bhutan -0.0259 -2.216 0.047
Congo -0.0096 -1.860 0.088 Brazil -0.0228 -24.277 0.000
Ecuador -0.0028 -0.958 0.349 Brunei -0.0105 -4.544 0.001
Egypt -0.0021 -0.572 0.574 Bulgaria -0.0308 -6.179 0.000
Gabon 0.0069 2.061 0.052 Canada -0.0045 -3.887 0.001
Greenland -0.0003 -0.281 0.782 China -0.0166 -7.311 0.000
Guatemala -0.0015 -0.903 0.377 Costa Rica -0.0053 -4.693 0.000
Guinea-Bissau -0.0021 -1.274 0.217 Cuba -0.0086 -6.560 0.000
Guyana 0.0016 0.884 0.387 Cyprus** -0.0250 -9.591 0.000
Honduras 0.0019 1.110 0.280 Denmark -0.0043 -2.687 0.014
Iran* -0.0006 -0.886 0.386 Dominican Republic -0.0350 -9.217 0.000
Kenya -0.0025 -1.716 0.101 Eq. Guinea -0.0314 -7.431 0.000
Mali 0.0044 1.586 0.128 Ethiopia -0.0045 -3.157 0.005
Mongolia -0.0086 -1.651 0.123 Falkland Isl -0.0233 -4.537 0.000
Netherland Antilles -0.0010 -1.747 0.095 Fiji -0.0167 -7.946 0.000
Nicaragua -0.0028 -1.018 0.320 France -0.0041 -6.985 0.000
Nigeria* 0.0004 1.183 0.250 Gambia** -0.0206 -6.805 0.000
Senegal -0.0004 -0.204 0.841 Germany -0.0016 -3.727 0.001
Seychelles -0.0018 -0.855 0.402 Ghana -0.0122 -3.856 0.001
Somalia 0.0004 0.898 0.380 Gibraltar -0.0318 -4.988 0.000
St. Helena 0.0253 2.138 0.052 Greece -0.0100 -8.859 0.000
St. Pierre Miq 0.0068 1.830 0.081 Guadeloupe -0.0087 -7.956 0.000
Syrian Arab Rep -0.0063 -1.803 0.086 Guinea -0.0057 -3.941 0.001
Togo 0.0002 0.118 0.907 Haiti -0.0258 -14.011 0.000
Vietnam -0.0009 -0.340 0.737 India -0.0089 -4.531 0.000
Western Sahara 0.0021 0.110 0.914 Indonesia* -0.0140 -4.725 0.000
Yemen 0.0023 0.651 0.528 Ireland -0.0193 -16.139 0.000
Isreal -0.0084 -18.273 0.000
Italy -0.0038 -9.522 0.000
Japan -0.0042 -5.898 0.000
Jordan -0.0104 -5.360 0.000
Korea, Republic of -0.0085 -13.590 0.000
Liberia** -0.0349 -6.404 0.000
* indicates OPEC members and net petroleum exporters
** indicates countries with fewer than 1 million workers in 1990  
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Primaries - Manufactures Continued Manufactures - Primaries
Country     CoefficienT-statistic P-value Country     Coefficient T-statistic P-value
Lybia* -0.0024 -7.411 0.000 Afghanistan 0.0038 3.632 0.002
Madagascar -0.0038 -4.128 0.000 Algeria* 0.0041 3.202 0.004
Malaysia -0.0143 -5.877 0.000 Angola 0.0067 4.149 0.000
Maldives -0.0327 -2.524 0.027 Bolivia 0.0128 5.908 0.000
Malta -0.0067 -9.101 0.000 Chile 0.0151 7.000 0.000
Mauritius** -0.0335 -23.641 0.000 Cote d'Ivoire 0.0080 6.518 0.000
Morocco -0.0228 -18.529 0.000 Djibouti 0.0281 3.764 0.003
Mozambique -0.0181 -6.524 0.000 Iraq* 0.0061 2.652 0.015
Myanmar -0.0166 -5.643 0.000 Lebanon 0.0111 3.989 0.001
Nepal -0.0385 -12.085 0.000 Malawi 0.0017 2.914 0.008
New Cledonia -0.0092 -2.578 0.018 Mauritania 0.0012 2.888 0.009
New Zealand -0.0150 -5.241 0.000 Norway* 0.0177 6.320 0.000
Niger -0.0767 -5.325 0.000 Paraguay 0.0044 2.658 0.015
Oman** -0.0023 -3.081 0.006 Suriname 0.0075 4.205 0.000
Pakistan -0.0086 -4.191 0.000 Uganda 0.0029 3.339 0.003
Panama** -0.0165 -6.342 0.000 Zambia 0.0034 2.377 0.028
Papua New Guinea -0.0107 -3.273 0.004
Peru -0.0082 -3.263 0.004
Philippines -0.0135 -4.552 0.000 Manufactures - Manufactures
Poland -0.0292 -6.994 0.000 Country     Coefficient T-statistic P-value
Portugal -0.0062 -11.129 0.000 Belgium-Luxembourg -0.0011 -1.049 0.306
Qatar* -0.0096 -3.937 0.001 Belize -0.0048 -1.450 0.163
Reunion -0.0043 -3.969 0.002 Cambodia -0.0051 -1.016 0.322
Romania -0.0173 -3.640 0.002 Cayman Islands** -0.0218 -1.463 0.169
Rwanda -0.0078 -3.665 0.003 Central African Rep -0.0111 -1.661 0.123
Saudi Arabia* -0.0096 -2.898 0.009 Czechoslovakia -0.0054 -0.767 0.452
Singapore -0.0195 -11.997 0.000 El Salvador -0.0035 -1.374 0.185
Solomon Islands -0.0209 -2.662 0.021 Finland -0.0001 -0.180 0.859
Spain -0.0073 -6.350 0.000 French Guiana -0.0093 -1.615 0.122
Sri Lanka -0.0282 -16.818 0.000 Hong Kong -0.0003 -0.914 0.372
St. Kitts Nevis -0.0147 -5.444 0.000 Hungary 0.0001 0.094 0.926
Sudan -0.0024 -4.530 0.000 Iceland -0.0109 -2.059 0.053
Sweden -0.0027 -7.273 0.000 Jamaica -0.0019 -1.345 0.194
Taiwan -0.0086 -16.498 0.000 Kiribati 0.0010 0.457 0.653
Tanzania -0.0039 -2.830 0.010 Korea, DPR -0.0025 -0.807 0.429
Thailand -0.0241 -10.863 0.000 Kuwait* -0.0103 -1.663 0.112
Trinidad-Tobago -0.0127 -6.529 0.000 Laos 0.0074 0.512 0.618
Tunisia -0.0245 -13.481 0.000 Mexico* -0.0017 -0.398 0.695
Turkey -0.0327 -18.531 0.000 Netherlands -0.0026 -1.802 0.087
Turks Caicos Isl -0.0398 -2.918 0.013 Sierra Leone -0.0065 -1.244 0.228
United Arab Emirates* -0.0034 -6.065 0.000 South Africa -0.0030 -0.912 0.373
United States -0.0074 -11.077 0.000 Switzerland -0.0001 -0.257 0.800
Uruguay -0.0136 -4.146 0.001 United Kingdom 0.0035 1.870 0.076
USSR (former)* -0.0069 -5.127 0.000 Zaire -0.0017 -0.497 0.624
Venezuela* -0.0103 -7.827 0.000
Yugoslavia (former) -0.0047 -9.725 0.000
Zimbabwe -0.0224 -10.315 0.000
* indicates OPEC members and net petroleum exporters
** indicates countries with fewer than 1 million workers in 1990  
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Figure A.1  Comparison of Primary Export Classifications as a Share of Total Exports in 
Selected Countries 
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Figure A2: Sectoral Composition of Exports – Primaries-Oriented Countries 
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Figure A3: Per Capita Incomes and the Share of Primaries in World Exports 
 
a. 1970 
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c. 1990 
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